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Abstract
This paper analyses the socio-economic context into which environmental policies and
ecological sentiments emerge through empirically studying the relation to the environment
of different kinds of capitalism. The association and interaction of the relation to the
environment with other key social relations, e.g. the labour-capital relations, are studied
and discussed. To achieve this, I draw from Regulation Theory and augment its analytical
framework with an explicit environmental dimension. I then conduct an empirical analysis of
the diversity of contemporary capitalism including the social relation to the environment for
a sample of thirty-seven OECD and BRICS countries. Five kinds of capitalism are identified:
the Northern-continental European, the Southern-central European, the Anglo-Saxon and
Pacific, the Emerging Countries and the Two Giants. A main result is the correspondence
between ecology-prone social relations to the environment, labour oriented capital-labour
relations and welfare-oriented states. However, the results show that countries that are
the most ecology-prone are also the ones that have the most relocated their environmental
impact, an observation consistent with the critical literature on the Environmental Kuznets
Curve.
Keywords: Society-environment relation; Capitalism; Mode of regulation; Institution; Envi-
ronmental policy; Ecological macroeconomics




Recent political developments in countries such as the United States and Brazil indicate how
important it is to consider ecological issues and environmental policies in relation to the sur-
rounding socio-economic contexts into which society-environment relations emerge. The neces-
sity to consider these contexts has been underlined by several authors in Ecological Economics
(EE). Buch-Hansen (2014), for example, emphasizes the importance of considering the diver-
sity of capitalist systems and institutional change to analyse sustainable trajectories. Similarly,
Chester (2010) insists that environmental issues are embedded within capitalism. She contends
that environment-economy relations should be comprehended in this context. Rezai and Stagl
(2016) further argue that considering societal institutions and power relations is central to an
ecological transition. However, Ozkaynak et al. (2012) identify a lack of consideration in EE
for the political and socio-economic contexts into which ecological economic policies are decided
and implemented. Institutionalist approaches are relevant to comprehend society-environment
relations together with other socio-economic dynamics (Douai and Montalban, 2012). Although
institutionalism is well represented in EE (Paavola and Adger, 2005; Vatn, 2005, 2017), the
emerging field of ecological macroeconomics has yet to add an institutionalist perspective to its
modelling approach (Rezai and Stagl, 2016; Hardt and O’Neill, 2017; Svartzman et al., 2019).
In this paper, I attempt at partly filling these empirical and theoretical gaps. I discuss an insti-
tutionalist theoretical framework relevant to comprehend socio-economic contexts encompassing
the society-environment relation and I empirically study the relation to the environment of dif-
ferent kinds of capitalism. I further analyse how the relation to the environment is associated
and interacts with other key social relations, e.g. the labour-capital relations. This paper there-
fore sheds light on the socio-economic conditions of (un)ambitious environmental policies and
(anti-)ecological sentiments.
To achieve this, I draw from Regulation theory (RT), which provides an analytical framework
of the historical and spatial diversity of capitalist systems. RT is an institutionalist approach
to economics. It appeared in the 1970s during the crisis of Fordism, the so-called Golden Age
of capitalism in high income countries that lasted from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. RT
then developed into a theory of capital accumulation dynamics and crises. The central assump-
tion is that capitalism is not a self-equilibrating system. It needs to be regulated by a set of
institutions that will ensure its coherent reproduction (Petit, 1999). However, RT has neglected
environmental issues for a long time. A key reason for this is that the productivity gains that
shaped the fordist social compromise in high income countries started to decrease before the
1970s energy crisis. This steered reluctance from regulationists to consider energy as a cause
of the end of Fordism and of the gradual shift to Neoliberalism (Chester, 2010; Lipietz, 2002).
It entailed blindness to what Becker and Raza (2000) name the ecological constraint, that is to
the constraining factor the environment constitutes for capitalist production. Amidst the few
regulationist works considering the environment, theoretical attempts at linking RT with EE
were undertaken by Zuindeau (2007) and Douai and Montalban (2012). Only a couple of works
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offer empirical analyses of the spatial and historical diversity of capitalism in relation to envi-
ronmental issues, focusing on climage change, models of environmental policies and the social
relation to energy (Koch, 2011; Elie et al., 2012; Cahen-Fourot and Durand, 2016). Despite these
works, the theoretical status of environmental issues in RT is not yet clear as I will explain later.
It is therefore necessary to first discuss the integration of an environmental dimension in RT to
clarify the theoretical framework that structures the empirical study.
First, I tackle the debate regarding the social relation to the environment in RT. I recall
the main positions and contend that the debate is not well formulated: the status given to the
environment in RT should not be viewed in a polarized manner but should rather be replaced in
the historical evolution of the ecological constraint. Such a historical stance allows to argue in
favour of an explicit environmental dimension that has been lacking until now in this approach.
This discussion provides the framework that I then use as a basis for the empirical analysis.
Second, by the means of principal components analysis, multiple correspondences analysis
and clustering applied to 2015 data for thirty-seven OECD and BRICS countries, I study the
diversity of contemporary capitalism including the social relation to the environment. I identify
five kinds of capitalism with diverse relations to the environment, ranging from ecology-prone to
ecology-adverse. A main result is the correspondence between ecology-prone social relations to
the environment, labour oriented capital-labour relations and welfare-oriented states.
This paper therefore contributes to both RT and EE in two main ways: First, it advances the
debate regarding the integration of the environment in the RT analytical apparatus. It adapts
the latter to tackle key twenty-first century issues that are likely to shape the future of capitalism
and possible other economic systems. Furthermore, it provides EE with a framework to deepen
the study of environmental policies within their socio-economic contexts. Second, to the best of
my knowledge, it provides the first study of the diversity of capitalism that integrates together
an environmental dimension with the other social relations usually considered in RT. It therefore
contributes to the understanding of modern capitalisms’ relation to the environment and tends
towards an integrated analysis of environmental and socio-economic dynamics. This fits with
EE pre-analytic vision of the society as embedded in the environment.
I first introduce the main concepts of RT in section 2. I then briefly survey the debate
on the society-environment relation in RT in section 3.1 and argue for integrating an explicit
environmental dimension in section 3.2. In section 4, I introduce the statistical methods and
the data used for the empirical analysis. The results are presented in section 5 and discussed in
section 6.
2 Institutional forms and mode of regulation
I use two key concepts of RT: the institutional forms and the mode of regulation. The institu-
tional forms codify the fundamental social relations that shape a given kind of capitalism. They
regulate capitalism: They stabilize and normalize social conflicts and power struggles amongst
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antagonistic social groups or classes. They embody political compromises between them and
ensure the reproducibility of the system until the next major crisis (Görg and Brand, 2000;
Boyer and Saillard, 2002a). Institutionalised compromises therefore produce a kind of capitalism
through their combination as the mode of regulation. The mode of regulation is the specific
configuration of individual and collective behaviours codified in the institutional forms observed
at a given period/place. It ensures the coordination and compatibility of decentralized decisions
from actors only partially comprehending the adjustment principles of the whole system (Boyer
and Saillard, 2002b).
There are five institutional forms. First, the monetary regime is the confidence-based relation
allowing decentralized agents to settle debt, to enter and participate in market exchanges and
to link market and non-market productions (Guttmann, 2002; Aglietta, 2002; Théret, 1998).
Second, the wage-labour nexus is the "the set of legal and institutional conditions that govern
the use of wage-earning labour as the workers’ mode of existence" (Boyer, 2002, p. 74). It
encompasses the means of production used, the employment relations between the workers and
the firm, the wage determinants and the access of the labour force to commodities and non-market
services ensuring its reproduction (Petit, 1999; Boyer and Saillard, 2002a; Aglietta, 2002). The
third is the form of competition, which relates to the set of market and value chains rules. It is
all the conventions and mediations shaping business relations amongst producers. Fourth, the
form of the state is the set of institutionalised compromises shaping the state’s intervention and
importance in the economy and society. The fifth is the insertion into the international regime:
The set of rules organising the cohabitation of nation-states and currencies within the global
socio-political system, international trade and capital flows networks (Petit, 1999). As we can
see, the environmental dimension is completely absent from the RT framework.
3 Integrating the environment into Regulation theory
The relation to the environment is not specific to capitalism: any kind of society has a relation to
the environment. In capitalism, the relation to the environment takes a peculiar form as nature
is commodified and treated as a form of capital (Becker and Raza, 2000; Brand and Görg, 2008).
However, the relation to the environment is not uniform: It is shaped by power balances that
can shift between times and places. Stated otherwise, a specific form of the social relation to the
environment within capitalism is defined and shaped by the mode of regulation (Chester, 2010;
Zuindeau, 2007). Hence arises the question whether this relation is an institutional form in itself
or if it is encompassed into the five other forms.
3.1 The social relation to the environment: encompassed versus au-
tonomous
Historically, regulationist economists denied the existence of an institutional form codifying the
social relation to the environment. Chester (2010) argues that each of the five institutional
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forms determines the social relation to the environment, individually and collectively through
the mode of regulation. Similarly, Douai and Montalban (2012) consider that the relation to
the environment is governed by all the fundamental social relations of capitalism and cannot,
therefore, be reduced to a specific institutional form. The social relation to the environment would
only be the projection on the space of the society-environment relations of the five institutional
forms (Boyer, 2015). A main reason for this line of argument is that no compromise with the
environment would be possible but only amongst humans. Thus, no institutionalised compromise
could arise that is similar to the social relations codified by the usual five forms (Lipietz, 2002).
To the contrary, some authors argue in favour of a social relation to the environment au-
tonomous from the five other forms. According to Becker and Raza (2000)
"this sixth structural form regulates access to, and utilization of, the material world
both for productive and reproductive activities. Hence, it also regulates the spatial
and temporal distribution of the ecological costs and benefits of these (re-)productive
activities." (p. 11)
Cahen-Fourot and Durand (2016) further argue that this form encompasses both the formal and
non-formal socio-technical, cultural and legal elements of the relation to the environment. It
supports and is the product of socio-political conflicts around ecological issues between various
political and socio-economic bodies. It can alter existing regulations and create new ones with
the potential of changing the prevailing course of capital accumulation. It cannot, therefore, be
reduced to the other forms.
Moreover, the impossibility of a compromise with the environment can be questioned. Envi-
ronmental philosophers have shown the possibility of a diplomatic cohabitation with nature made
of compromises with the wild, e.g. the wolf (Morizot, 2016, 2017). Legal rights given to rivers
and forests or rules forbidding constructions for environmental reasons are further examples of
compromises between society and nature. There is nonetheless an ontological difference between
the compromises usually understood in RT and direct society-environment compromises: The
former are socio-economic compromises mediated in political ways; the latter are of a more prac-
tical nature. Humans compromise with the environment in practical ways. They compromise
amongst themselves about ecological issues in political ways. The two types of compromise are
different yet complementary: Practical compromises with the environment require political com-
promises between antagonistic interests on ecological issues. Conversely, no political compromise
is disembedded from the environment: It is unlikely that people from small Pacific Islands will
reach institutionalised compromises under water.
Given these nuances, I will argue that these two polarized positions are not mutually exclusive
and should rather be historicized in light of the ecological constraint. Of course, each one of the
five traditional institutional forms of RT is likely to influence the society-environment relations.
Their respective effects are not clear-cut and, as argued by Chester (2010), the combination of
all these effects will produce a distinct interaction pattern between the mode of regulation as a
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whole and the environment. Yet, the social relation to the environment may also experience an
institutionalisation process that makes it autonomous from the five institutional forms.
3.2 Historicity beyond binarity: The institutionalisation of the social
relation to the environment as a regulation of capitalism
As Petit (1999) explains, other social relations progressively turned into institutional forms in the
past. After World War II, public intervention gained credibility and the dominance of the market
was questioned. The monetary regime and international relations were clarified. So was public
intervention, through Keynesian thought and policies, that crystallized in Europe around the
institutionalisation of the wage-labour nexus. The latter became an institutional form in itself
and gained prominence over the others. Thus, before the wage-labour nexus institutionalisation,
the organization of work could be thought as the projection of the pre-existing four institutional
forms on the space of the capital-labour relations.
I contend that the social relation to the environment is experiencing a similar process. As
the ecological constraint becomes more acute, existing institutions become progressively unable
to normalize increasing ecological conflicts and to embody satisfying compromises regarding
the access to and the distribution of environmental cost and benefits (Douai and Montalban,
2012). Several social changes and related discourses emerged in the 1960s and 1970s that were
key in paving the way for a new perception of the ecological constraint, especially "the new
conceptualization of pollution and environment that became part of the general public awareness
(...), the dramatic increase in world population and the question of the sufficiency of food and
other resources (...) and the discourse on energy" that accompanied the discussion on resources
and became central from 1973 onwards (Røpke, 2004, p. 298). Quite ironically, major oil
companies helped create the environment as a political object. In 1971, facing pressures from
governments in the Middle East to share an increasing part of their profits, they needed to
legitimize a steep rise in prices. They shifted from the idea of abundance that prevailed to a
vision in terms of finite resources. The scarcity vision that emerged made it clear that societies
should care about their resources and environment (Mitchell, 2009, 2013). New philosophical
developments accompanied the rising politization of ecological issues. Jonas’ (1979) inverted the
responsibility principle. Instead of being responsible for the consequence of an action, societies
were then responsible by anticipation of a being or an object that we must take care of in the
long run (Larrère and Larrère, 2009).
These political and philosophical evolutions laid the ground for a new social relation to
the environment, historically located and determined by the ecological constraint. Social blocs
(Amable and Palombarini, 2008) supporting new compromises regarding environmental issues
could start to emerge. Considering this historical process clarifies that the social relation to
the environment is not fully embedded into the five institutional forms and is not only the
projection of the latter on the space of the society-environment relation anymore. It becomes
an institutional form in itself and, as such, is increasingly shaping the modes of regulation in
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combination with the other forms. In the empirical part, I then study the diversity of capitalism
through the modes of regulation with six institutional forms, including the social relation to the
environment.
4 Empirical strategy: methods and data
The empirical part builds on the discussion above and is inspired mainly by Amable (2003) and
also by Elie et al. (2012) and Jahn (2014). Amable studies the diversity of modern capitalism in
a sample of twenty-one OECD countries. He finds five kinds of capitalism: The social-democrat,
the continental European, the Mediterranean, the liberal market and the Asian. Elie et al. (2012)
investigate whether Amable’s typology translates into environmental policy. They identify four
models of environmental regulation: liberal, weak intensity, strong socialization of environmental
issues and mixed liberal/socialized. Rooted in comparative politics, Jahn (2014) identifies three
worlds of environmental politics in a similar sample of twenty-one OECD countries: high environ-
mental performance-environmental policy regime, high environmental performance-productionist
policy regime and low environmental performance-productionist regime. Here I take an integrat-
ing stance in embedding the social relation to the environment into the study of the diversity of
capitalism.
Amable bases his analysis on five institutional domains: the labour market, the products
market, social protection, education and the financial system. Since the theoretical discussion
here is about the institutional forms regulating capitalism, I locate the analysis at a slightly
different level: the mode of regulation. Stated otherwise, Amable characterizes the diversity of
modern capitalism based on institutional domains while I do based on institutional forms. Of
course, both partly overlap: The form of competition and the wage-labour nexus are akin to
the products and labour markets, and the form of the state encompasses education and social
security. I follow Amable regarding the choice of many underlying variables although I delve
much less into details regarding peculiar domains (e.g. education or social protection). In the
following sections I present the statistical methods used to conduct the analysis and the data
chosen to model each of the institutional forms.
4.1 Principal components analysis, multiple correspondences analysis
and clustering
Similarly to the three studies above, the statistical techniques used in this analysis are princi-
pal components analysis (PCA), multiple correspondences analysis (MCA) and clustering. PCA
and MCA are methods allowing to synthesize large datasets into fewer, synthetic dimensions
(the principal components) — respectively applying to quantitative and qualitative variables.
Each component is a linear combination of the raw variables and is orthogonal to the others:
It synthesizes a decreasing yet supplementary part of the total inertia (variance) of the raw
data (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2005; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). As preparatory steps to
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clustering, PCA and MCA allow to remove the noise from the data to keep only relevant infor-
mation and make the former more meaningful and stable (Husson et al., 2010). The selected
components are those carrying a statistically significant information. These components carry
an inertia greater than those obtained by the 0.90- or 0.95-quantile of normal (PCA) and random
(MCA) distributions1. Clustering allows for classifying countries characterized by quantitative
and qualitative variables. I use a mixed hierarchical-consolidated clustering method applied to
the components selected through the PCA/MCA. The hierarchical clustering identifies clusters
of countries based on their distance on a Euclidean space: The closer two countries, the more
similar they are. It minimizes the growth of the intra-cluster inertia while minimizing the reduc-
tion of the between-cluster inertia. The partition obtained is then used as the initial number
of clusters for the consolidating k-means algorithm, which improves the homogeneity of each
cluster (Husson et al., 2017). Choosing the number of clusters is not an exact science and I
follow a combination of criterion: the number suggested by the algorithm, the inertia gain to
add one more cluster, the length of the links on the hierarchical tree and the meaningfulness of
the clusters (Husson et al., 2010). Following Elie et al. (2012), I first construct synthetic qualita-
tive variables using PCA and clustering. They represent each institutional form, based on their
respective underlying variables approximating the social relation they codify. Since a cluster can
be identified to a categorical variable (Husson et al., 2017), the clusters become the modalities
of the institutional forms. They illustrate the diversity of the latter in the sample. This also
eliminates the bias of axes over-determination in the final analysis by the institutional forms
modelled with more variables than others (Elie et al., 2012). I then apply MCA and clustering
to these qualitative variables to obtain the modes of regulation. Figure 1 sums up the empirical
strategy2.
1When the significant information amounted for less than 50% or when only the first axis was found to carry
significant information, I kept more axes.
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Figure 1: Empirical strategy from the modelling of institutional forms into qualitative synthetic
variables based on quantitative raw variables to the typology of the modes of regulation. j
indicates the countries.
Table 1 indicates the modalities obtained for each of the institutional forms. It is important
to stress that modelling the codification of key social relations into institutional forms is a tricky
exercise and is incomplete in essence. The raw variables chosen to capture the social relations
can be discussed at length and are certainly not exhaustive. They were selected following the
theory and the literature. A rather parsimonious approach was opted for in the trade-off between
completeness and meaningfulness to facilitate the interpretation of the results. In all but one
case, data are for 2015 or the most recent year before3. In very few cases where data were simply
missing, I used variables that are very similar or I imputed them statistically.
Variables and the modalities of the institutional forms are described and commented upon
in the subsections below. One should bear in mind that the results are relative to the whole
sample, e.g. a country that has an ecology-oriented social relation to the environment may not
be very ecology-oriented with regards to other referentials, e.g. the most climate-friendly IPCC
scenario of emissions mitigation.
3The environmental treaties ratifications are as of 2016.
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Institutional form Modality
Social relation to the
environment
Materially onshore, most unequal distribution of environmental amenities and ben-
efits and ecology-adverse political orientation 1
Ecology-adverse socio-political orientation 2




Materially offshore, least unequal distribution of environmental amenities and ben-
efits and ecology-prone political orientation 5
Monetary regime
Financial openness with strong preference for liquidity and strict prudential regu-
lation
1
Intensive activism of the central bank 2
Low interest and inflation, weak preference for liquidity and loose prudential reg-
ulation
3
Financial closeness with high interest and inflation, weak preference for liquidity
and loose prudential regulation
4




Labour protective, wage-oriented value added distribution, low working time and
low income inequality
1
Labour market flexibility, wage-oriented value added distribution, low unemploy-
ment and high gender wage inequality
2
Profit-oriented value added distribution, high unemployment and low income in-
equality
3
Oriented towards profit re-investment rather than distribution, high working time
and high income inequality
4
Labour market flexibility, capital-oriented value added distribution, high working
time and high income inequality
5
Forms of competition
Strong competition in all sectors, strong openness to foreign suppliers and strong
political involvement in public enterprises
1
Weak competition in services and banking, strong openness to foreign suppliers
and weak political involvement in public enterprises
2
Weak competition and closeness to foreign suppliers but strong competition in the
postal sector and strong communication and simplification of rules and procedures 3
Weak competition and closeness to foreign suppliers but strong competition in
banking
4
Weak competition, closeness to foreign suppliers, strong government control but
strong competition in the telecom sector
5
Forms of the state
Sovereign and economic control-oriented 1
Economic control- and partially welfare-oriented 2
Sovereign, partially welfare-oriented and smaller overall size 3
Weakly welfare oriented 4
Partially welfare-oriented and smaller overall size 5
Strongly welfare-oriented and bigger overall size 6
Insertion into the international
regime
Through agriculture and secondary sectors and a weak integration into non-
political globalizations
1
Through a weak integration into all dimensions of globalization 2
Through extractive and energy sector 3
Through manufacturing sector and trade globalization 4
Through services sectors and political globalization 5
Through FIRE services and a weak integration into political globalization 6
Through non-FIRE services and a strong integration into all dimensions of glob-
alization
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Table 1: The six institutional forms and their modalities in contemporary capitalism.
4.2 The social relation to the environment
Accordingly to its definition, the social relation to the environment is modelled to represent both
its material and socio-political aspects. The material dimension is captured through the GDP in-
tensity in greenhouse gases (GHG), energy and materials, and through the share of net imports
of embodied CO2, energy and materials in their total consumption using Eora data (Lenzen
et al., 2012, 2013). These latter variables give an indication of the relative location of each
countries in global GHG emissions, energy and materials chains and of their ecological footprint.
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Socio-political aspects are represented using six variables: The class structure of emissions (9th
to 1st income deciles emissions ratio computed from Chancel and Piketty (2015) data); environ-
mental conflicts (Temper et al., 2015); stringency of environmental regulation, enforcement of
environmental regulation and ratifications of environmental treaties (World Economic Forum);
and the number of Greenpeace financial supporters and of International Union for Conservation
of Nature (IUCN) organizations. These variables aim at representing the unequal and conflict-
ual dimensions as well as different kinds of environmentalism and degrees of social demand for
environmental policies.
As indicated in table 1, I obtain five kinds of social relation to the environment, ranging from
the least to the most ecology-oriented one. Unsurprisingly, the intensity of economic activity in
natural resources seems prominent in shaping the socio-political orientation towards ecological
issues: the more onshore the utilization of materials, energy and GHG, the less ecology-oriented
the social relation to the environment. The sample nonetheless provides nuances to this general
observation: the third kind of social relation to the environment is more ecology-oriented than the
fourth one despite being more locally intensive in energy and GHG. The latter is characterized by
an offshore materiality as its countries are the biggest importers of embodied energy and materials
and big importers of embodied GHG. However, none of the variables capturing the socio-political
aspects are statistically different from the sample average. If looked at nonetheless, they indicate
in particular a higher number of environmental conflicts but a looser environmental regulation.
This can indicate that new compromises regarding the environment are not yet institutionalized
(see table A5 in the appendix).
4.3 The monetary regime
Guttmann (2002) defines a monetary regime as the combination of monetary policy (e.g. the
interest rate), financial regulation, lender of last resort mechanisms and capital flows regulation.
Accordingly, I use the short term interest rate set up by the central bank, the bank regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the central bank assets to GDP ratio and the Chinn-Itoh
index of capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006). However, as explained in section 2, RT
comprehends money as a social relation but the variables above merely represent its technical
and regulatory aspects. To capture partly the former, I add the inflation rate and the percentage
of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding to reflect the confidence (or lack of) in money
and the preference for liquidity.
The analysis indicates five kinds of monetary regimes, in particular distinguished by their
financial openness and preference for liquidity. Regimes with constrained capital flows have
higher inflation rates than those with freer capital flows. A higher preference for liquidity goes
most of the time with a stricter prudential regulation (with the exception of cluster 5) (see tables
A9 and A10).
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4.4 The wage-labour nexus
Drawing from the definition in section 2, the wage-labour nexus is modelled using employment
protection, the rates of collective bargaining coverage and union density and the weekly working
hours to capture the employment relationship between workers and firms. The adjusted wage
share, the share of distributed profit and the rate of unemployment aims at capturing the relative
bargaining power between labour and capital and the access of the labour force to the means of
its reproduction. Income inequality and the gender wage gap are included to represent the wage
segmentation of the labour market.
Here again five kinds of wage-labour nexus appear, from the most to the least labour-
protective one. An interesting observation is that, amongst all samples, the only association
that holds in every case is between the rate of unemployment and the share of distributed profit.
The two variables exhibit a systematic positive correlation, whatever their significance and the
significance, sign and absolute value of the other variables (see tables A14 and A15).
4.5 The form of competition
To model the forms of competition I mainly follow Amable and use the large set of OECD
indicators regarding the regulations of the goods and services markets (Koske et al., 2015).
Eighteen variables measure the competitive intensity of markets, the kind of regulation that is
being used and the degree of involvement of the state. Markets structures are captured by seven
variables indicating the degree of competition in telecom, electricity, gas, postal services, rail4
and banking sectors (see table A16).
As for the previous institutional forms, I obtain five kinds of competition regime with gradual
intensities and specificities. Only one exhibit a strong competition in all sectors. Others vary in
terms of competition in particular sectors and openness to foreign suppliers. Generally speaking,
high-income countries are more competition-oriented although several of them still have strongly
regulated sectors. Middle-income countries exhibit in particular a higher degree of closeness to
foreign suppliers (see tables A21 and A22).
4.6 The form of the state
As defined in section 2, the state is modelled using variables capturing two main dimensions:
its size and importance in society and the socio-economic compromises embodied in political
choices regarding the provision of public services, e.g. whether the state is more or less welfare
or sovereign-oriented. Final consumption expenditure of the general government, tax revenues,
government health, education and military expenditures in percentage of GDP and an index
of state control over the economy represent both dimensions. Health, education and military
expenditures in percentage of government expenditures5 represent the second dimension.
4These variables had to be imputed for Russia.
5Education and military expenditures in % of government expenditures had to be imputed for, respectively,
China and Russia.
11
Six kinds of state appear in the whole sample. Their orientation towards welfare services is
not correlated to their size: Some states characterized by lower final consumption expenditures,
taxes and degree of state control over the economy have a higher percentage of government
expenditures going to education and health than states with a bigger overall size. However, the
kind of state exhibiting the biggest size is also the most welfare-oriented and the least sovereign-
oriented. States with a more sovereign-oriented stance also exert a stricter control over the
economy.
4.7 The insertion into the international regime
Last but not least, the insertion of national capitalisms in the international regime is modelled
through variables representing economic, financial, cultural and socio-political aspects. Based on
NACE categories (Eurostat, 2008) the position in the international division of labour is captured
through the shares in value added of agriculture, extractive and energy industries, manufactur-
ing, construction, finance-insurance-real estate (FIRE) and non-FIRE services. Furthermore, I
use the KOF globalization indexes of de jure and de facto trade, financial, social and political
globalizations (Dreher, 2006; Gygli et al., 2018) to capture the degree of integration into all
dimensions of globalization and the various ways the countries cohabit within the international
regime.
I obtain seven kinds of insertion: Some capitalisms are mostly inserted through specific
sectors while others exhibit common patterns across all dimensions of globalization. In particular,
Emerging countries are inserted in the international regime through a weak integration in all
dimensions of globalization.
5 Five kinds of capitalism with differing social relations to
the environment
This section describes the final results. I run the analysis on the full sample, used as a point
of reference. To refine the results and assess their consistency, I also analyse three country-
based and two literature-based sub-samples: OECD, European union and non-European union
countries; the Amable (2003)/Elie et al. (2012) and the Jahn (2014) samples. For a matter of
space and clarity, I focus on a synthetic presentation, highlighting the main kinds of capitalism
and the underlying combinations of institutional forms. The composition of the clusters for the
full sample and each sub-sample is indicated on figure 2 and table 2. The axes of the factorial
plans on figure 2 discriminate countries depending on their modalities for each institutional form
and allow to identify the clusters. Table 3 indicates the characteristics of each cluster and how
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I identify five capitalisms as seen through the lenses of their mode of regulation: the Northern-
continental European, the Southern-central European, the Anglo-Saxon and Pacific, the Emerg-
ing Countries and the Two Giants.
As shown in table 3, a first observation is that for some institutional forms, several modalities
characterize one kind of regulation mode. It is the case of the Anglo-Saxon and Pacific capitalism
with two somewhat contradictory kinds of social relation to the environment. The analysis
applied to the non-European countries sample indicates a difference between North America and
Pacific capitalisms: the former exhibit an ecology-adverse political orientation while the latter
is either more materially offshore with ambiguous ecological sentiments (Japan) or materially
onshore for energy and GHG but with an ecology-prone socio-political orientation (Australia
and New Zealand). These countries have otherwise similar institutional forms and only differ by
their degree of integration into political globalization.
An interesting result is the correspondence between the social relation to the environment
and the wage-labour nexus. The Northern-continental European capitalism has the most labour-
oriented one together with the most ecology-prone social relation to the environment. In the
Anglo-Saxon and Pacific capitalism, the wage-labour nexus is oriented towards labour flexibility
but still has a higher share of the value added distributed to labour and a lower distributed profit
share than other capitalisms outside the Northern-continental one. Other capitalisms exhibit less
labour-oriented wage-labour nexus and either ambiguous or ecology-adverse social relations to
the environment. The same observation can be made for the welfare state: more welfare oriented
capitalisms are also the ones with an ecology-prone social relation to the environment. This
result is consistent with the similar divide in the fields of environmental policy and welfare state
(Jahn, 2014).
Other associations of institutional forms have less clear patterns. For the monetary regime,
financial closeness with high interest and inflation correlates with ecology-adverse social relations
to the environment in the Emerging Countries and Two Giants capitalisms. It does not in the
Anglo-Saxon and Pacific case. For competition, a common feature of capitalisms with more
ecology-oriented social relations to the environment is their openness to foreign suppliers, despite
other differences in their competition regime. For example, strong competition cohabits with a
more nuanced competition regime in the Northern-continental European capitalism. In the
Anglo-Saxon and Pacific case, strong competition goes with a more ecology-prone social relation
to the environment in the Pacific capitalism but not in the North American one. To the contrary,
weak competition in all sectors and closeness to foreign suppliers are associated with ecology-
adverse social relations to the environment. As for the insertion into the international regime,
in line with the localization of environmental materiality, an insertion through services sector
is associated with an ecology-prone mode of regulation in the Northern-continental European
case as well as in the Anglo-Saxon and Pacific case. This observation holds also partly for the


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 Towards a model of ecology-prone capitalism ?
Looking at the production sphere, Lipietz (1997) formulates the hypothesis that countries with
a more labour-oriented wage-labour nexus have a more environment-friendly stance. The ne-
gotiated implication of workers in production and more secured employment favour shifting to
more ecological processes through higher skills and technological means. He further assumes
that environmental policies are seen as comparative advantages by more labour-friendly coun-
tries, while countries with less labour-oriented wage-labour nexus, e.g. Emerging countries or
the Two Giants, see it as an impediment to their development. The results showing a correspon-
dence between ecology-prone social relations to the environment and labour-oriented wage-labour
nexuses substantiate this hypothesis. Furthermore, ecology-adverse capitalisms exhibit a higher
share of distributed profit (with the notable exception of China). The latter has been shown
to slow down productive investment and innovation (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick,
2010; Stockhammer, 2006) and could then indicate less concerns about adopting more sustainable
production processes, which require long-term planning and patient capital. The comparative
advantage hypothesis also echoes the results as ecology-prone social relations to the environment
are associated with competition regimes featuring openness to foreign suppliers.
Looking at the social sphere also sheds light on the wage-labour nexus/welfare state/social
relation to the environment conundrum. Just as the "labour constraint" gave rise to a working
class movement that opposed the logic of capital and pushed for better living conditions, the
ecological constraint shapes new power struggles (O’Connor, 1988) and key actors preferences
— firms, state, citizens. Therefore, the social relation to the environment can only progress
towards a more ecological stance through, e.g., strong social movements or wide social blocs
supporting ambitious compromises on ecological issues (Amable and Palombarini, 2008). At
a more individual scale, less working hours, better employment protection and welfare public
services allow citizens to engage with issues that do not necessarily pertain to their immediate
daily concerns 6.
Interpreting the links between the monetary regime and the social relation to the environment
is more arduous. The cohabitation of high inflation and high interest rates monetary regimes
with ecology-adverse social relations to the environment in the Emerging Countries and the
Two Giants capitalisms might provide a clue. Evidences in the literature show that a trade-
off between monetary and environmental policies arises in some developing countries: As the
government renounces to seigniorage and adopts a restrictive monetary policy to fight inflation,
it fosters the rate of natural resources exploitation to find alternative funding (Combes et al.,
2015).
Last but not least, the insertion into the international regime shows the correspondence of the
productive structure and the social relation to the environment: The ecology-prone capitalisms
6The yellow jackets movement in France provides interesting clues in this regard: People were not protesting
against environmental measures but about them mostly falling on already impoverished people. A popular motto
was "they tell us about the end of the world but we don’t know how to end the month".
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are the ones whose environmental materiality is largely offshore. The degree of integration in
political globalization does not exhibit a clear pattern with the social relation to the environ-
ment. For instance, a strong integration is associated with ecology-prone (Northern-continental
European), ambiguous (Southern-central European) and ecology-adverse (North America) social
relations to the environment. When looking at the number of environmental treaties ratifica-
tions, the Two Giants and the Emerging Countries capitalisms show the weakest integration into
global environmental governance although the former exhibits an average integration into politi-
cal globalization. The Southern-central European capitalism shows a higher degree of integration
into global environmental governance than the Pacific capitalism but compromises regarding eco-
logical issues seem less institutionalised in the former than in the latter. This uncertain pattern
might indicate that — despite the global nature of many environmental challenges — the nation
state remains the most relevant level to understand the shaping of the social relation to the envi-
ronment. Indeed, the nation state is the structuring space of class relations and of the formation
of socio-economic compromises (Görg and Brand, 2000; Brand and Wissen, 2013).
Running the analysis on the Amable (2003) and Elie et al. (2012) sample, I retrieve five mod-
els: Northern European, Continental European, Japan and Ireland, Anglo-Saxon and Southern
European. Comparing with Amable indicates similarities although the composition of the clus-
ters are somewhat different. The level of analysis and data differ and countries may have shifted
from one model to another since the early 2000s. The environmental dimension may also be a
differentiating factor. Comparing with Elie et al. confirms that ecology-prone capitalisms tend
to overlap with stricter models of environmental regulation. Applying the analysis on the Jahn
(2014) sample allows to retrieve three capitalisms: Northern-continental European, Southern
European and Anglo-Saxon. There are mild similarities with the three worlds of environmental
politics in terms of cluster composition but the main conclusions remain: The most ecology-prone
capitalisms correspond to the most environmentally performing countries in Jahn7.
Perhaps there are models of capitalism better equipped for the transition towards sustainable
socio-economic systems than others. Capitalisms associating labour-oriented policies, welfare
public services and openness to foreign exchange might foster an ecology-prone social relation to
the environment and the conditions for such a transition. The results suggest that there might be
an institutional complementarity — that is the mutual reinforcement of institutions regulating
different areas of conflicts (Douai and Montalban, 2012) — between these specific forms of social
relation to the environment, wage-labour nexus, competition and state. However, the environ-
mental materiality of the ecology-prone capitalisms is offshore to a great extent, an observation
consistent with the critical literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve. These capitalisms
still imply an imperial mode of living, the fossilist patterns of production and consumption en-
tailing a disproportionate claim on global resources (Brand and Wissen, 2013).
7Table A62 in the appendix offers a comparison with Amable, Elie et al. and Jahn typologies.
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7 Conclusion
Contemporary capitalism faces an increasing ecological constraint that is reconfiguring the society-
environment relation. In Regulation Theory terms, it implies that the social relation to the
environment is becoming a regulation of capitalism in itself. It can no more be solely considered
a by-product of other key social relations. Replacing the theoretical debate in the historical
context of the rising ecological constraint, I argued for its integration as the sixth institutional
form shaping the modes of regulation of capitalism. Using this augmented RT framework, I then
conducted a study of the diversity of contemporary capitalism. I obtained five kinds of capital-
ism supported by modes of regulation exhibiting different patterns of association between the
social relation to the environment and the other institutional forms. Although there are of course
nuances, the main empirical result is that ecology-prone social relations to the environment go
together with a labour-oriented wage-labour nexus, a welfare-oriented state and openness to
international exchange.
This work can therefore be of interest to Ecological Economics on several grounds. It provides
a theoretical and empirical framework to contextualize and understand the (lack of) emergence
of environmental policies and alternatives to the current growth paradigm. It can also trigger
conceptual refinement: The social relation to the environment is close to the concept of social
metabolism in EE, defined as the way societies organize their exchanges with their environment
to reproduce their socio-economic systems (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1993; Muradian et al.,
2012; Martinez-Alier et al., 2010). The latter mainly focuses on the material aspects in providing
the conceptual basis for material flow analysis (Fischer-Kowalski and Hüttler, 1998) while the
former encompasses both the material and socio-political dimensions of the society-environment
interactions.
However, this work is, to the best of my knowledge, the first of its kind and not exempt of
limits. This is where ecological economists could fertilize RT very usefully, on three grounds at
least. First, the social relations codified in this sixth institutional form are complex — combining
the state, firms and citizens, themselves not homogeneous in their preferences — and are still to
be properly understood. Second, while the theoretical discussion refers to a historical process,
the empirical study takes a spatial stance and is a picture taken at one point in time. The
empirical part is then not a test or a proof of the theoretical discussion. Third, the discussion
focused on the influences of the five institutional forms on the social relation to the environment.
Reaching a full comprehension requires to understand these influences much deeper, but foremost
to understand how the social relation to the environment shapes the other institutional forms.
Finally, cross-fertilizing RT and EE could usefully add to ecological macroeconomics, which,
while promising, still lacks an institutionalist stance (Hardt and O’Neill, 2017; Rezai and Stagl,
2016). Ecological macroeconomics has been primarily a convergence between EE and post-
Keynesian economics but RT and PKE have long been close companions. Integrating the three in
the joint study of environmental and socio-economic dynamics is a promising avenue of research.
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This document provides the detailed results of all the intermediate steps to model the
institutional forms and the modes of regulation as presented in the article The social re-
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2
1 Introduction
This appendix contains the detailed results of all the intermediate steps of the empirical part
as well as well synthetic tables complementing the final results. Raw data, sources, principal
components analyses and clustering performed to model each institutional form are presented in
sections 2 to 7. Raw data, multiple correspondences analyses and clustering to model the modes
of regulation for the full, OECD, European union, non-European union, Amable (2003)/Elie et al.
(2012) and Jahn (2014) samples are presented in section 8 to14. Finally, table A64 indicates the
corresponding modes of regulation for each country.
A few values in the raw data used to model the form of competition and the form of the
state were missing for Russia and China. As explained in subsections 5.2 and 6.2, they were
imputed using an iterative algorithm implemented in the MissMDA package for R (Josse and
Husson, 2015). This procedure does not affect the identification of the principal components,
while providing a full dataset to work upon. As shown below, measures of imputation uncertainty
indicate sufficiently high quality: The imputed values are similar from one imputed dataset to
another when doing multiple imputation (1000). Finally, as the reader may notice, the clusters
happen sometimes to slightly vary between hierarchical trees and their final composition. This
is due to the consolidation k-means algorithm that is used on top of the hierarchical clustering
algorithm: the former improves the homogeneity of the clusters, which may result on a different
composition as compared to the initial hierarchical clustering.
1
2 The social relation to the environment
2.1 Sources and raw data
Name Variable Source
IUCN Organizations member of IUCN per mil-
lions inhab
https://portals.iucn.org/union/members-website and World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI, population)
GreenP Financial supporters of Greenpeace in %
of population
Greenpeace national websites and 2013 annual report and WDI
(population)
EnvConflicts Environmental conflicts per millions in-
hab
(Temper et al., 2015, conflicts) and WDI (population)
ClassGHG Class structure of GHG emissions Ratio of the emissions of the 9th income decile to the 1st income
decile, Piketty and Chancel (2015). All countries for 2013 except
Australia (2003) and New Zealand (1998). For Chile data were
missing and approximated using the ratio of income of the 9th to
the 1st deciles as values were really close for the other countries.
EnvReg Environmental regulation stringency World Economic Forum (WEF), Score: 1-7 ; 1 = very lax; 7 =
amongst the world most stringent, 2015-2016 weighted average,
http://reports.weforum.org/travel-and-tourism-competitiveness-
report-2017/ranking/#series=EOSQ160
EnfEnvReg Enforcement of environmental regulation WEF, Score: 1-7 ; 1 = Very lax ; 7 = Among
the world most rigorous, 2015-2016 weighted average,
http://reports.weforum.org/travel-and-tourism-competitiveness-
report-2017/ranking/#series=EOSQ161




EnerGDP GDP intensity in energy WDI, 2015 except for Brazil, China, India, Russia and South
Africa (2014)
GHGGDP GDP intensity in GHG OECDStat and Edgarv4.3.2 (GHG, for China, India and South
Africa) and WDI (GDP), 2015 except for Brazil, China, India,
South Africa (2012), Chile and Mexico (2013), Israel and South
Korea (2014)
MatGDP GDP intensity in materials OECDStat (materials) and World Development Indicators (GDP),
2015 for all countries
MatEmb Embodied materials in net import rela-
tively to material consumption Eora v199.82 (Lenzen et al., 2012, 2013)
EnerEmb Embodied energy in net imports rela-
tively to energy consumption
CO2Emb Embodied GHG in net imports relatively
to GHG consumption







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2 Principal components analysis
The first two principal components were kept for the analysis. They represent 58.67% of the
total variance of the dataset. The information represented on the axes 1:2 plan is therefore
significant: It is higher than the reference value (at the 5% significance level) for similar plans
obtained through simulating 2061 comparable random datasets following a normal distribution
of inertia percentages (33.49%). However, when looking at the individual axes, only the first one
carries an information above the reference value for the 0.95 quantile of random distributions
(44.52% vs. 18.89%). Since this value is lower than 50%, since that two axes are needed to
project individuals and data on the plan and that the latter carries a significant information, I
kept axis 2 as well.
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Figure A1: Factorial plan of the two first principal components (axes) for the countries. Countries
with a high absolute value on one axis have a high absolute value for the variables correlated to
this axis.
On figure A1, the first dimension discriminates mainly between countries on the right side
with high values for environmental regulation enforcement, environmental regulation, Greenpeace
supporters, IUCN organizations and embodied CO2 in imports and low values for the class
structure of emissions and the greenhouse gases intensity of GDP and countries on the left side
with high values for the energy, greenhouse gases and materials intensity of GDP and the class
structure of emissions and low values for embodied CO2, energy and materials in import and
environmental regulation. The second dimension distinguishes mainly countries on the positive
side with high values for EnerEmb and low values for EnfEnvReg from the others with negative
coordinates on the axis.
Figure A2 indicates that the variables are fairly well represented on the plan. Table A3
provides the details results of the PCA.
4


























































































Figure A2: Factorial plan of the two first principal components for the variables. The closer to
the unit circle a variable, the better its projection quality on the plan. The closer a variable for
an axis, the higher its correlation to this axis. Countries with a high absolute value on an axis
have a high value for the given variable.
5
Coordinates Square cosine Contributions
Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 1 Dim. 2
ClassGHG -0.59 -0.14 0.35 0.02 6.10 1.04
CO2Emb 0.79 -0.42 0.63 0.18 10.80 9.57
EnerEmb 0.41 -0.65 0.17 0.42 2.92 22.87
EnerGDP -0.85 0.34 0.72 0.12 12.51 6.24
EnfEnvReg 0.74 0.46 0.54 0.21 9.34 11.54
EnvConflicts 0.09 -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.68
EnvReg 0.79 0.40 0.63 0.16 10.86 8.61
EnvTreaties 0.54 0.16 0.29 0.03 5.02 1.44
GHGGdp -0.87 0.29 0.76 0.08 13.13 4.51
GreenP 0.58 0.44 0.34 0.19 5.88 10.38
IUCN 0.62 0.58 0.39 0.33 6.70 18.10
MatEmb 0.58 -0.23 0.33 0.05 5.77 2.83
MatGDP -0.79 0.20 0.63 0.04 10.84 2.19
Australia 0.05 1.66 0.00 0.30 0.00 4.04
Austria 1.97 0.11 0.54 0.00 1.81 0.02
Belgium 0.69 2.87 0.02 0.37 0.23 12.13
Brazil -2.23 -1.32 0.31 0.11 2.31 2.55
Canada -0.61 -0.13 0.11 0.01 0.17 0.02
Chile -2.61 -0.15 0.27 0.00 3.17 0.03
China -5.50 0.96 0.81 0.02 14.14 1.34
Czechia -0.55 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.14 0.03
Denmark 3.17 0.67 0.84 0.04 4.69 0.67
Estonia -1.20 2.47 0.13 0.55 0.67 8.94
Finland 2.33 1.43 0.59 0.22 2.54 3.00
France 1.68 -0.55 0.58 0.06 1.32 0.45
Germany 1.74 0.54 0.43 0.04 1.41 0.43
Greece 0.30 -1.98 0.01 0.58 0.04 5.73
Hungary -0.89 -0.76 0.13 0.09 0.37 0.84
India -4.46 1.33 0.71 0.06 9.28 2.61
Ireland 1.05 -1.42 0.22 0.39 0.52 2.95
Israel 0.10 -0.96 0.00 0.09 0.01 1.36
Italy 0.16 -1.98 0.00 0.63 0.01 5.78
Japan 1.25 -0.77 0.25 0.10 0.73 0.87
Mexico -2.38 -1.40 0.58 0.20 2.64 2.87
Netherlands 3.41 2.63 0.44 0.26 5.44 10.19
New Zealand 1.18 1.85 0.16 0.40 0.65 5.02
Norway 2.47 0.09 0.53 0.00 2.86 0.01
Poland -1.26 -0.55 0.36 0.07 0.74 0.44
Portugal 0.81 -0.98 0.22 0.32 0.30 1.41
Russia -5.66 1.21 0.80 0.04 14.94 2.14
Slovakia 0.47 -1.76 0.03 0.45 0.10 4.56
Slovenia 0.81 -0.59 0.03 0.01 0.31 0.51
South Africa -4.15 1.59 0.78 0.11 8.04 3.69
South Korea -1.34 -0.03 0.41 0.00 0.84 0.00
Spain 1.51 -1.21 0.37 0.24 1.07 2.15
Sweden 3.16 0.40 0.78 0.01 4.67 0.23
Switzerland 4.73 0.93 0.70 0.03 10.45 1.27
Turkey -1.65 -2.48 0.21 0.47 1.28 9.00
United Kingdom 2.04 -1.19 0.62 0.21 1.95 2.06
United States -0.63 -0.68 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.68
Table A3: Detailed results for the PCA applied to the variables of the social relation to the
environment. Coordinates values are identical to correlation values. The higher the absolute
value of a coordinate, the stronger the correlation of the individual/variable to the axis. The
sum of the square cosines indicates the projection quality of the individual/variable on the
factorial plan. The contribution values indicate how much an individual/variable determinates
the axis.
2.3 Clustering
As indicated by figures A3 and A4, the clustering process led to select five classes. The hierar-
chical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a clustering in five classes and the inter-inertia
gains are still substantial. Table A4 indicates which variables characterize the most each of the
clusters. Table A5 indicates the distribution of countries across clusters and provides a synthesis










































































































































Figure A3: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of countries through their social relation to the
environment.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 The monetary regime
3.1 Sources and raw data
Name Variable Source
Int_rate 3-months interbank rate except Turkey (discount rate)
and Brazil (day-to-day interbank rate)
OECD and FRED (Turkey)
Inf_rate Inflation rate Consumer prices, all items, OECD
Fin_reg Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%) Global Financial Database, World Bank, 2015 except
South Korea (2014)
LLR Central bank assets to GDP (%) or Central bank
claims on private sector (Mexico)
Global Financial Development Database, World Bank
; IMF IFS (central bank claims on private sector).
Data for New Zealand is as of 2010
Fin openness Capital account openness - Chinn-Ito Index Chinn and Ito (2006)
Liq Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (%) Global Financial Development database, World Bank
Table A6: Variables and sources for the monetary regime.
Country Int_rate Inf_rate Fin_reg LLR FinOpen Liq
Australia 2.3 1.5 13.9 0.5 0.9 18.7
Austria 0.0 0.9 16.5 2.7 1.0 29.7
Belgium 0.0 0.6 18.7 2.9 1.0 20.8
Brazil 14.3 9.0 16.4 20.4 0.2 61.4
Canada 0.8 1.1 14.2 4.7 1.0 37.6
Chile 4.9 4.3 12.6 0.5 0.7 19.3
China 4.8 1.4 13.5 2.2 0.2 16.4
Czechia 0.3 0.3 16.7 0.0 1.0 23.8
Denmark -0.1 0.5 19.6 0.0 1.0 44.5
Estonia 0.0 -0.5 28.0 0.2 1.0 35.6
Finland 0.0 -0.2 23.1 2.0 1.0 58.6
France 0.0 0.0 17.1 4.0 1.0 54.0
Germany 0.0 0.2 18.3 1.6 1.0 46.4
Greece 0.0 -1.7 16.5 6.9 0.8 5.7
Hungary 1.5 -0.1 17.0 0.3 1.0 30.8
India 7.7 5.9 12.7 4.0 0.2 12.3
Ireland 0.0 -0.3 24.4 15.5 1.0 26.4
Israel 0.1 -0.6 14.0 1.0 1.0 22.4
Italy 0.0 0.0 14.5 9.9 1.0 28.7
Japan 0.2 0.8 15.6 54.4 1.0 24.8
Mexico 3.3 2.7 15.0 0.0 0.7 42.8
Netherlands 0.0 0.6 20.1 2.1 1.0 22.6
New Zealand 3.2 0.3 13.5 2.6 1.0 11.3
Norway 1.3 2.2 18.9 0.0 1.0 30.7
Poland 1.7 -0.9 16.0 0.0 0.7 11.0
Portugal 0.0 0.5 13.3 3.5 1.0 12.1
Russia 14.8 15.5 12.7 0.6 0.7 39.6
Slovakia 0.0 -0.3 17.8 2.7 0.8 5.8
Slovenia 0.0 -0.5 18.8 3.3 0.7 11.8
South Africa 6.1 4.5 14.2 1.3 0.2 22.9
South Korea 1.8 0.7 14.2 1.4 0.7 12.6
Spain 0.0 -0.5 14.7 5.6 1.0 22.3
Sweden -0.3 0.0 24.2 2.1 1.0 31.6
Switzerland -0.8 -1.1 17.0 0.3 1.0 61.3
Turkey 9.0 7.7 15.6 0.5 0.4 13.9
United Kingdom 0.6 0.1 19.6 0.0 1.0 45.1
United States 0.2 0.1 14.1 23.5 1.0 21.5
Table A7: Raw data for the monetary regime.
3.2 Principal components analysis
The first two dimensions were kept for the analysis. They express 66.94% of the total dataset
inertia. This value is greater than the reference value 52.96% that is the 0.95-quantile of the
inertia percentages distribution obtained by simulating 1509 data tables of equivalent size on
the basis of a normal distribution. The variability explained by this plane is thus significant.
However, only the first axis presents an amount of inertia greater than those obtained by the
0.95- quantile of random distributions (45.61% against 30.54%). Since this value is below 50%
and that two axes are needed to construct the factorial plan, I kept the second dimension too.
10
The dimension 1 opposes countries sharing low values FinOpen and Fin_reg and high values
for Int_rate, Inf_rate and LLR to countries with high values for variables Fin_reg, Liq and
FinOpen and low values for Int_rate, Liq and Inf_rate.
Dimension 2 discriminates between countries with high values for Fin_reg, Liq and FinOpen
and low values for Int_rat, countries with high values for Int_rate, Inf_rate and LLR and
countries with low values Liq and Inf_rate.








































































































































































































































































































Figure A5: Projection of the countries on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the monetary
regime.
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Figure A6: Projection of the variables on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2.
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Coordinates Square cosines Contribution
Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 1 Dim. 2
Int_rate 0.96 0.23 0.91 0.05 33.40 4.01
Inf_rate 0.89 0.30 0.80 0.09 29.22 7.00
Fin_reg -0.59 0.53 0.35 0.29 12.73 22.31
LLR 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.68
FinOpen -0.82 0.11 0.67 0.01 24.41 1.02
Liq -0.08 0.91 0.01 0.83 0.24 64.98
Australia 0.16 -0.79 0.02 0.44 0.02 1.33
Austria -0.70 -0.03 0.61 0.00 0.49 0.00
Belgium -0.95 -0.24 0.68 0.04 0.89 0.12
Brazil 4.28 2.58 0.63 0.23 18.05 14.04
Canada -0.33 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.03
Chile 1.60 -0.65 0.73 0.12 2.54 0.90
China 2.01 -1.15 0.49 0.16 3.98 2.80
Czechia -0.75 -0.33 0.52 0.10 0.55 0.22
Denmark -1.15 1.15 0.46 0.46 1.31 2.79
Estonia -2.11 1.72 0.39 0.26 4.38 6.25
Finland -1.64 2.29 0.33 0.64 2.65 11.12
France -0.98 1.25 0.25 0.41 0.95 3.32
Germany -1.04 1.04 0.42 0.42 1.07 2.29
Greece -0.60 -1.64 0.10 0.76 0.35 5.70
Hungary -0.68 0.11 0.51 0.01 0.45 0.03
India 3.27 -0.98 0.85 0.08 10.54 2.01
Ireland -1.67 0.64 0.42 0.06 2.75 0.85
Israel -0.65 -0.85 0.21 0.36 0.42 1.52
Italy -0.64 -0.48 0.26 0.14 0.40 0.48
Japan -0.55 -0.85 0.01 0.03 0.30 1.53
Mexico 0.78 0.69 0.31 0.24 0.60 1.01
Netherlands -1.09 0.05 0.65 0.00 1.17 0.01
New Zealand 0.06 -1.28 0.00 0.60 0.00 3.47
Norway -0.54 0.54 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.62
Poland -0.06 -1.23 0.00 0.65 0.00 3.21
Portugal -0.39 -1.43 0.05 0.70 0.15 4.30
Russia 4.84 1.86 0.73 0.11 23.11 7.30
Slovakia -0.49 -1.32 0.08 0.59 0.24 3.70
Slovenia -0.55 -0.91 0.13 0.35 0.30 1.75
South Africa 2.61 -0.39 0.77 0.02 6.70 0.31
South Korea 0.35 -1.26 0.06 0.81 0.12 3.36
Spain -0.72 -0.81 0.33 0.41 0.51 1.38
Sweden -1.68 1.01 0.52 0.19 2.79 2.15
Switzerland -1.31 1.53 0.26 0.35 1.70 4.95
Turkey 2.95 -0.16 0.86 0.00 8.61 0.05
United Kingdom -1.12 1.19 0.43 0.49 1.23 2.97
United States -0.52 -1.01 0.05 0.20 0.26 2.13
Table A8: Detailed results for the PCA applied to the variables of the monetary regime.
13
3.3 Clustering
As indicated by figures A7 and A8, the clustering process led to select five classes. The hierarchi-
cal tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying such a clustering and the inter-inertia gains are
still substantial. Table A9 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster. Table



























































































































































Figure A7: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of countries through their monetary regime.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 The wage-labour nexus
4.1 Sources and raw data
Table A11 indicates the variables modelling the wage-labour nexus and their sources. when not
available from Ameco, the wage share was computed using OECDStat data asW/(GDP−T )×100
with W the compensation of employees and T the taxes minus subventions on production and
imports, to have the wage share at factor costs. Following Husson (2010), the distributed profit
share is understood as the difference between the margin rate and the investment rate. It
is therefore equal to (GOS − GFCF )/GDP × 100 with GOS the gross operating surplus and
GFCF the gross fixed capital formation. Finally, the collective bargaining coverage rate for India
was missing and imputed by 0 because the imputation algorithm gave a negative value, which
is impossible. However, even if the imputed value was inconsistent it indicated the reliability of
this imputation methodology as collective bargaining coverage is extremely weak in India.
Name Variable Source
Wshare Wage share Ameco and author’s own calculation from OECDStat data for Chile,
Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa and Israel. 2015 except
for Australia and New Zealand (2014), Brazil (2011), Chile, Russia,
South Africa, South Korea (2013), China, Israel, Mexico (2012), India
(2009) and Turkey (2006).
DistProf Distributed profit share Author’s own calculation from OECDStat data. 2015 except for 2015
except for Australia, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland,
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, United States (2013),
Brazil (2011), China, Israel (2012), India (2009) and Turkey (2006).
Labprotec Strictness of employment pro-
tection – individual and col-
lective dismissals (regular con-
tracts)
OECDStat, 2013 except for Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa
(2012), and Slovenia and United Kingdom (2014)
CollBarg Collective bargaining coverage
rate
ILOStat; 2015 except Australia, Brazil, France, Hungary, Ireland,
Norway, Switzerland (2014), China, Russia (2013) and New Zealand
(2011).
Unions Union density rate ILOStat; 2015 except except Greece (2013), India (2011) and Ireland
(2012).
Unemp Unemployment rate WDI, World Bank
Gini Gini coefficient after tax, after
transfers
OECDStat; 2015 for all countries except for Austria, Denmark,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland,Italy,Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland
(2014), Brazil (2013), Russia (2011).
WorkingHours Weekly working hours ILOStat ; 2015 except for China (2008), India (2006) and South Korea
(2012).
Gender Gender wage gap (%) OECDStat, ILOStat for Brazil and Russia, Chi and Li (2014) for
China, Varkkey and Korde (2013) for India and author’s own cal-
culations based on Statistics South Africa (2016) for South Africa.
2015 except for Brazil, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland,
Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey (2014), Sweden and India
(2013) and China (2009).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Principal components analysis
The first two dimensions of PCA express 56.72% of the total inertia contained in the dataset.
This value exceeds 41.41% that is the reference value of the 0.95-quantile of the inertia percent-
ages distribution obtained by simulating 1099 data tables of equivalent size on the basis of a
normal distribution. The variability explained by this plane is thus significant. The first three
axis present an amount of inertia greater than those obtained by the 0.95-quantile of random
distributions (71.63% against 55.92%). I therefore kept these axes for the analysis.
Axis 1 distinguishes countries sharing high values DistProf , WorkingHours and Gini and
low values Wshare, CollBarg and Unions from countries with high values for the variables
CollBarg, Wshare and Unions and low values for the variables WorkingHours, Gini and
Gender. The second axis opposes countries with high values for Gender and low values for
DistProf to countries with high values for the variables DistProf , WorkingHours and Gini
and low values for Wshare, CollBarg and Unions. The third axis opposes countries exhibiting
high values for the variables Gini, Unemp and WorkingHours and low values for Wshare to
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Figure A9: Projection of the countries on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the wage-labour
nexus.
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Figure A10: Projection of the countries on the factorial plan of the axes 3 and 4 for the wage-
labour nexus.


















































































Figure A11: Projection of the variables on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the wage-
labour nexus.
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Figure A12: Projection of the variables on the factorial plan of the axes 3 and 4 for the wage-
labour nexus.
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Coordinates Square cosine Contributions
Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 3 Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 3 Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 3
Wshare -0.80 0.26 -0.19 0.65 0.07 0.04 19.61 3.75 2.58
DistProf 0.50 -0.79 0.00 0.25 0.62 0.00 7.53 34.39 0.00
Labprotec -0.22 -0.02 0.77 0.05 0.00 0.59 1.45 0.02 43.68
CollBarg -0.83 -0.05 0.38 0.70 0.00 0.15 21.09 0.16 10.83
Unions -0.57 0.19 0.42 0.33 0.04 0.18 9.91 2.02 13.13
Unemp 0.01 -0.56 0.37 0.00 0.32 0.14 0.01 17.59 10.27
Gini 0.70 0.27 0.37 0.49 0.07 0.14 14.75 3.91 10.11
WorkingHours 0.83 0.20 0.35 0.69 0.04 0.12 20.85 2.16 9.18
Gender 0.40 0.81 0.06 0.16 0.65 0.00 4.82 36.00 0.23
Australia -0.78 0.02 -1.33 0.21 0.00 0.59 0.50 0.00 3.53
Austria -1.84 0.40 0.16 0.70 0.03 0.01 2.76 0.24 0.05
Belgium -2.95 -0.37 1.61 0.71 0.01 0.21 7.12 0.21 5.21
Brazil 1.04 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.88 0.06 0.05
Canada -0.56 0.58 -1.75 0.07 0.07 0.64 0.26 0.51 6.17
Chile 2.69 0.51 -0.08 0.80 0.03 0.00 5.95 0.39 0.01
China 0.93 4.73 2.48 0.03 0.74 0.20 0.71 33.48 12.38
Czechia 0.32 -0.34 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.02
Denmark -2.95 0.10 0.59 0.69 0.00 0.03 7.14 0.01 0.70
Estonia 0.53 1.36 -1.26 0.05 0.32 0.27 0.23 2.76 3.19
Finland -2.36 0.50 0.82 0.56 0.03 0.07 4.55 0.37 1.37
France -2.05 -0.32 0.51 0.48 0.01 0.03 3.44 0.15 0.52
Germany -1.06 0.21 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.06 0.00
Greece 0.55 -3.28 0.62 0.02 0.65 0.02 0.25 16.05 0.78
Hungary 0.30 -0.45 -1.09 0.04 0.08 0.44 0.08 0.30 2.38
India 4.45 0.32 1.23 0.82 0.00 0.06 16.22 0.16 3.04
Ireland 0.42 -1.41 -0.53 0.04 0.40 0.06 0.15 2.96 0.57
Israel 0.25 0.48 -0.07 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.35 0.01
Italy -1.67 -1.65 1.20 0.38 0.37 0.20 2.28 4.06 2.91
Japan 0.34 1.30 -1.19 0.03 0.38 0.31 0.09 2.52 2.83
Mexico 3.91 -0.92 1.12 0.73 0.04 0.06 12.57 1.26 2.54
Netherlands -2.00 -0.37 0.18 0.54 0.02 0.00 3.27 0.20 0.07
New Zealand 0.06 -0.70 -3.01 0.00 0.04 0.76 0.00 0.73 18.23
Norway -1.70 -0.36 0.13 0.47 0.02 0.00 2.38 0.20 0.03
Poland 1.00 -1.14 -0.43 0.25 0.33 0.05 0.81 1.96 0.37
Portugal -0.27 -0.71 0.86 0.02 0.14 0.21 0.06 0.75 1.50
Russia 0.21 1.96 0.33 0.01 0.78 0.02 0.04 5.74 0.23
Slovakia 0.96 -1.40 -0.32 0.24 0.52 0.03 0.75 2.94 0.21
Slovenia -1.50 -0.44 0.09 0.46 0.04 0.00 1.84 0.29 0.02
South Africa 2.52 -0.17 2.01 0.28 0.00 0.18 5.19 0.04 8.17
South Korea 1.21 2.38 -0.84 0.11 0.44 0.06 1.20 8.49 1.43
Spain -0.92 -1.85 0.73 0.09 0.36 0.06 0.69 5.11 1.08
Sweden -2.74 0.80 1.15 0.65 0.06 0.12 6.14 0.96 2.69
Switzerland -0.99 0.69 -1.12 0.29 0.14 0.38 0.81 0.72 2.54
Turkey 3.42 -1.80 0.60 0.66 0.18 0.02 9.60 4.85 0.73
United Kingdom 0.12 0.65 -1.38 0.00 0.11 0.49 0.01 0.63 3.86
United States 1.11 0.48 -2.30 0.15 0.03 0.63 1.00 0.35 10.62
Table A13: Detailed results for the PCA applied to the variables of the wage-labour nexus.
4.3 Clustering
As indicated by figures A13 and A14, the clustering process led to select five classes. The
hierarchical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a clustering in five classes and the inter-
inertia gains are still substantial. Table A14 indicates which variables characterize the most each
of the clusters. Table A15 indicates the distribution of countries across clusters and provides a
















































































































































































Figure A13: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of countries through their wage-labour nexus.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5 The form of competition
5.1 Sources and raw data
Name Variable Source
ABC Administrative burdens for corporation
Koske et al. (2015). For regulations
indicators:index 0 to 6 from the least to the
most restrictive regulation. For market
structure indicator: index 0 to 6 from
atomistic competition to monopoly.
ABP Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms
ATX Antitrust exemption for public enterprises
BEN Entry barriers in 8 network sectors (gas, electricity, water, rail
transport, air transport, road freight transport, postal services and
telecommunication) and degree of vertical separation in 3 network
sectors (gas, electricity and rail transport).
BSS Entry barriers in professional services, freight transport services
and retail distribution.
CCR Command and control regulation
CSR Communication and simplification of rules and procedures
DCB Direct state control over enterprises (based on 30 business sectors).
FDI Barriers to FDI in 22 sectors in terms of foreign equity limitations,
screening or approval mechanisms, restrictions on the employment
of foreigners as key personnel and operational restrictions
GIN Government involvement in network sectors in 6 network sectors
(electricity, gas, rail transport, air transport, postal services and
telecommunication).
GOV Governance of state-owned enterprises: degree of insulation of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from market discipline and degree
of political interference in the management of SOEs.
LBR Legal barriers to entry in 30 business sectors
LPS Licences and permits system
PCT Price controls in 8 sectors (air transport, road freight transport,
retail distribution, telecommunication, electricity, gas, water, pro-
fessional services).
SCP Scope of state-owned enterprises
TFS Differential treatment of foreign suppliers





Market structure of telecom, electricity, gas, post and rail sectors
Hstat H-statistic. It measures the elasticity of banks revenues relative to
input prices. 1 = perfect competition ; =< 0 = monopoly ; 0 to
1 = monopolistic competition ; > 1 = oligopolistic competition
Global Financial Development Database,
World Bank. 2015 for all countries except
concerning Lerner index for Australia,
Estonia,Finland, Greece, Ireland and South
Korea (2010), Japan (2014), New Zealand
(2011) and Portugal and South Africa (2013).
LernerIndex Lerner Index. It measures the market power in the banking market
as the difference between output prices and marginal costs (relative
to prices). Higher values of the Lerner index indicate less bank
competition.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Country Telec_struc Elec_struc Gas_struc Post_struc Rail_struc Hstat LernerIndex
Australia 1.60 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.31 0.17
Austria 1.36 0.00 1.50 2.00 0.00 0.71 0.55
Belgium 1.51 1.50 0.00 2.00 3.00 0.68 0.17
Brazil 1.93 0.00 6.00 3.00 6.00 0.74 0.01
Canada 1.57 3.00 0.00 2.00 1.50 0.81 0.39
Chile 1.30 0.00 0.75 1.00 4.50 0.81 0.4
China 0.00 3.75 0.00 2.00 6.00 0.57 0.26
Czechia 1.34 0.75 3.00 1.00 0.00 0.61 0.42
Denmark 1.40 0.75 1.50 3.00 1.50 0.48 0.5
Estonia 1.74 3.75 4.50 4.00 3.00 0.7 0.24
Finland 0.98 0.00 6.00 6.00 4.50 0.77 0.09
France 1.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.67 0.4
Germany 1.47 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.88 -0.2
Greece 1.38 3.75 6.00 4.00 6.00 0.91 0.21
Hungary 1.94 0.00 2.25 4.00 3.00 0.61 0.33
India 1.03 0.00 2.25 4.00 3.00 0.63 0.22
Ireland 1.51 0.00 1.50 3.00 6.00 0.07 0.27
Israel 1.34 6.00 4.50 2.00 6.00 0.53 0.34
Italy 1.25 0.00 0.75 4.00 0.00 0.87 0.58
Japan 1.91 0.00 3.00 2.00 4.50 0.44 0.39
Mexico 1.88 5.25 6.00 0.00 6.00 0.75 0.72
Netherlands 1.36 0.00 0.75 2.00 3.00 0.69 0.21
New Zealand 1.63 0.00 1.50 4.00 6.00 0.28 0.24
Norway 1.61 0.00 4.50 4.00 1.50 0.64 0.5
Poland 1.16 0.00 6.00 1.00 0.00 0.66 0.45
Portugal 1.56 1.50 3.00 3.00 4.50 0.75 0.31
Russia 0.72 0.47
Slovakia 1.97 0.75 3.00 2.00 1.50 0.74 0.3
Slovenia 1.61 1.50 3.00 5.00 3.00 0.78 0.17
South Africa 2.35 3.00 6.00 4.50 6.00 0.86 0.23
South Korea 1.50 4.50 6.00 2.00 6.00 0.57 0.34
Spain 1.68 0.00 1.50 2.00 3.00 0.41 0.53
Sweden 1.65 0.00 3.00 4.50 3.00 0.41 0.45
Switzerland 1.67 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.52 0.42
Turkey 2.26 1.50 3.00 2.00 6.00 0.67 -0.01
United Kingdom 0.80 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.59 0.06
United States 1.05 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.50 0.46 0.26
Table A18: Market structure indicator data for the form of competition before the statistical
imputation of missing values for Russia. Imputed missing values for Russia for Telec_struc,
Elec_struc, Gas_struc, Post_struc and Rail_struc are respectively: 1.65, 2.81, 4.24, 2.47 and
5.89
5.2 Imputation of missing data
Values for the structure of the electricity, gas, postal and railways sectors are missing for Russia.
We imputed them using the MissMDA packages for R (Josse and Husson, 2015) and checked
for the quality of the imputation through a comparison of 1000 imputations. As figures A15,
A16 and A17 show, the statistical imputation is of very good quality, with little variation in the
dimensions, the positions of the countries and of the variables on the first factorial plan. The
values for the imputed variables are indicated in the caption of table A18.
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Figure A15: Imputations of missing variables modelling the form of competition: stability of the
principal components across multiple imputations.


















































Figure A16: Imputations of missing variables modelling the form of competition: stability of the
countries across multiple imputations.
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Figure A17: Imputations of missing variables modelling the form of competition: stability of the
variables across multiples imputations.
5.3 Principal components analysis
The first two dimensions of PCA express 37.58% of the total dataset inertia. This value is greater
than the reference value of 23.81%, the variability explained by this plane is thus significant (the
reference value is the 0.95-quantile of the inertia percentages distribution obtained by simulating
1000 data tables of equivalent size on the basis of a normal distribution). The first three axes
present an amount of inertia (48.51%) greater than those obtained by the 0.95-quantile of random
distributions (33.16%). To keep more than 50% of the total inertia, I nonetheless kept also the
fourth dimension. The total inertia captured by the first fourth axes is 56.4%. Another reason
to keep the fourth axis is to diminish the weight of India and China in the modelling of the form
of competition. Indeed, they were found to be outliers. A country is considered an outlier when
its contribution to the plane exceeds three standard deviations from the average contribution.
Here, the cumulated contribution of India and China to the construction of the plan 1:2 is 34.8%.
However, given the importance of those two countries, I decided to keep them in the analysis.
The first axis discriminates between countries with high values for BSS and low values
for TFS,ABP, SCP,ABC, Elec_struc,Gas_struc,BSS, FDI, ATX,BEN,Rail_struc and
PCT and countries with high values for ABP,ABC,ATX, BEN,CCR,DCB,Elec_struc,
Gas_struc,GIN,LBR,PCT,Rail_struc, SCP and TFS. Axis 2 distinguishes countries that
have high values for CSR,ABC, SCP,CCR, BEN,DCB,PCT and low values for Telec_struc
from countries with high values for Elec_struc,ATX,PCT, TFS, Gas_struc, Rail_struc,
BEN,LBR,CCR, Telec_struc and low values for CSR. The third axis discriminates between
countries exhibiting high values for FDI, and DCB and low values for Hstat,BSS, Post_struc
and Telec_struc and countries with high values for Gas_struc, CCR, Telec_struc,BSS,Hstat
and low values for FDI,ATX and GOV . Finally, the fourth axis opposes countries exhibiting
high values for LPS, Telec_struc, ATX,FDI and low values for SCP and LernerIndex to
countries with high values for Elec_struc,ATX, TFS,LernerIndex and FDI and low values
30
for Post_struc and CSR.
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Figure A18: Projection of the countries on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the form of
competition.
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Figure A19: Projection of the countries on the factorial plan of the axes 3 and 4 for the form of
competition.
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Figure A20: Projection of the variables on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the form of
competition.
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As indicated by figures A22 and A23, the clustering process led to select five classes. The
hierarchical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying such a clustering and the inter-inertia
gains are still substantial. Table A21 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster








































































































































































Figure A22: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of countries through their form of competition.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 The form of the state
6.1 Sources and raw data
Name Variable Source
StateControl Degree of state control over the econ-
omy
Koske et al. (2015); index 0 to 6 from the least to the
most restrictive control
Taxes Taxe revenue in % of GDP (excludes
social security contributions)
WDI, World Bank
Finalcons General government final consumption
expenditure in % of GDP
WDI, World Bank
HealthGDP Domestic general government health
expenditure in % of GDP
WDI, World Bank ; 2015 except for Australia, Japan
(2014), Israel and New Zealand (2013)
EducGDP Government expenditure on education,
total in % of GDP
WDI, World Bank, except for Greece: Author’s own
calculations based on Classifications of the Func-
tion of Government (COFOG) data from OECD-
Stat, and China: Author’s own calculations based
on data from http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0504/
c90000-9211086.html. 2015 except for Canada
(2011), Denmark, Japan and the USA (2014) and In-
dia (2013).
MilitaryGDP Military expenditure (% of GDP) WDI, World Bank
HealthGOV Domestic general government health
expenditure (% of general government
expenditure)
WDI, World Bank, except for Greece and South Ko-
rea: Author’s own calculations based on COFOG data
from OECDStat. 2015 except for Australia, Japan
(2014), Israel and New Zealand (2013).
EducGOV Government expenditure on education,
total (% of government expenditure)
WDI, World Bank, except for Greece and South Ko-
rea: Author’s own calculations based on COFOG data
from OECDStat. 2015 except for Canada (2011), Den-
mark, Japan and The USA (2014) and Israel (2013).
MilitaryGOV Military expenditure (% of general
government expenditure)
WDI, World Bank, except for Greece and South Ko-
rea: Author’s own calculations based on COFOG data
from OECDStat.
Table A23: Variables and sources for the form of the state before statistical imputation of missing
data. Value for imputed data for China (education expenditure in % of government expenditure)
and Russia (military expenditures in % of general government expenditures) are respectively: XX





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.2 Imputation of missing data
Data for EducGOV for China and for MilitaryGOV for Russia were missing are had to be
statistically imputed following the same procedure as for missing data in section 5.2. Figures
A24, A25, A26 show that the imputation is of very high quality with barely any variation in the
first two dimensions and in the positions of the countries and of the variables on the factorial
plan 1:2. Values for the imputed data are indicated in the caption of table A24.





















Figure A24: Imputations of missing variables modelling the forms of the state: stability of the
principal components across multiple imputations.
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Figure A26: Imputations of missing variables modelling the forms of the state: stability of the
variables across multiples imputations.
















































Figure A25: Imputations of missing variables modelling the forms of the state: stability of the
countries across multiple imputations.
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6.3 Principal components analysis
Les 2 premiers axes de l’ ACP expriment 60.18% de l’inertie totale du jeu de données ; cela signifie
que 60.18% de la variabilité totale du nuage des individus (ou des variables) est représentée dans
ce plan.
The factorial plan built from the first two axis expresses 60.18% of the total inertia. This value
exceeds the reference value 41.32% of the 0.95-quantile of the inertia percentages distribution
obtained through simulating 2157 comparable random dataset following a normal distribution.
The information contained on the first plan is therefore significant. However, axes 3 and 4 also
convey a significant information, as the first four dimensions sum up 88.07% of the total inertia,
which is higher than the reference value of 68.08%. I therefore kept axes 1 to 4 for the analysis.
Axes 1 and 2 oppose countries with high values for Taxes, EducGDP , Finalcons and
HealthGDP and low values for StateControl and MilitaryGOV to countries with high values
for StateControl,MilitaryGOV andMilitaryGDP and low ones forHealthGDP , HealthGOV
and Finalcons. Axis 3 differentiate countries with high values for EducGOV , EducGDP and
HealthGOV and low values for HealthGDP and FinalCons from countries with high values
for Finalcons and low values for EducGOV and EducGDP . Finally, the fourth axis differentiate
between countries with high values for HealthGOV and low values for Finalcons and countries
with high values for EducGOV and EducGDP but low values for HealthGDP .
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Figure A27: Projection of the countries on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the form of
the state.
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Figure A28: Projection of the countries on the factorial plan of the axes 3 and 4 for the form of
the state.
















































































Figure A29: Projection of the variables on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the form of
the state.
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As indicated by figures A31 and A32, the clustering process led to select six classes. The hierar-
chical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a such a clustering and the inter-inertia gains
are still substantial. Table A26 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster.




















































































































































































Figure A31: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of countries through their form of the state.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7 The insertion into the international regime
7.1 Sources and raw data
Name Variable Source
PrimAgri Primary sector, agriculture All sectors are expressed in share of gross value
added. Author’s own calculations based on
OECDStat data and World Development Indicators
data (for China). Sectors are according to ISIC
revision 4 except for Russia, India and South Africa
(revision 3). 2015 except Australia, Ireland, Israel,
Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea,
Switzerland, Turkey, the USA (2014), China (2013),
India (2009) and New Zealand (2012).
PrimIndus Primary sector, extractive and energy activ-
ities: mining and quarrying, energy produc-
tion, water supply sewerage, waste manage-
ment and remediation activities
SecManuf Secondary sector, manufacturing
SecConst Secondary sector, construction
Ter_Serv Tertiary sector, non-FIRE services
Ter_FIRE Tertiary sector, FIRE: financial, insurance and
real estate activities
Tradeglobfacto KOF index of trade globalisation de facto
Dreher (2006); Gygli et al. (2018)
Tradeglobjure KOF index of trade globalisation de jure
Finglobfacto KOF index of financial globalisation de facto
Finglobjure KOF index of financial globalisation de jure
Socglobfacto KOF index of social globalisation de facto
Socglobjure KOF index of social globalisation de jure
Polglobfacto KOF index of political globalisation de facto
Polglobjure KOF index of political globalisation de jure















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.2 Principal components analysis
The first two dimensions of PCA express 55.91% of the total dataset inertia. This value is
higher than 32.15%, the reference value is the 0.95-quantile of the inertia percentages distribution
obtained by simulating 1019 comparable data tables based on a normal distribution. However,
only the first axis presents an amount of inertia greater than those obtained by the 0.95-quantile
of random distributions (42.81% against 18.1%). For the same reasons as above, I nonetheless
kept also the second axis.
Axis 1 opposes countries sharing high values for Socglobfacto, Finglobfacto, Ter_Serv,
Finglobjure, Tradeglobjure, Socglobjure, Polglobjure and Tradeglobfacto and low values
for PrimAgri and PrimIndus to countries with high values for PrimAgri, SecManuf and
SecConst and low values for Socglobjure, Finglobjure, Ter_Serv, Finglobfacto, Socglobfacto,
Tradeglobjure and Polglobjure. The second axis opposes countries sharing high values for
PrimIndus and low values for Polglobfacto and Ter_FIRE to countries with low values for
Polglobjure, Tradeglobjure, Finglobfacto and Finglobjure.
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Figure A33: Projection of the countries on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the insertion
in the international regime.
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Figure A34: Projection of the variables on the factorial plan of the axes 1 and 2 for the insertion
in the international regime.
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Coordinate Square cosines Contributions
Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 1 Dim. 2
PrimAgri -0.76 0.20 0.58 0.04 9.71 2.16
PrimIndus -0.13 0.68 0.02 0.46 0.27 24.83
SecManuf -0.27 0.03 0.07 0.00 1.18 0.05
SecConst -0.28 0.51 0.08 0.26 1.30 14.17
Ter_Serv 0.83 -0.14 0.69 0.02 11.56 1.08
Ter_FIRE 0.03 -0.84 0.00 0.71 0.01 38.78
Tradeglobfacto 0.60 0.42 0.36 0.18 5.94 9.65
Finglobfacto 0.91 0.06 0.83 0.00 13.79 0.22
Tradeglobjure 0.89 0.17 0.79 0.03 13.12 1.48
Finglobjure 0.94 -0.01 0.88 0.00 14.61 0.00
Socglobfacto 0.89 -0.16 0.78 0.02 13.07 1.31
Socglobjure 0.91 0.14 0.83 0.02 13.90 1.05
Polglobfacto -0.15 -0.23 0.02 0.05 0.36 2.92
Polglobjure 0.27 0.21 0.07 0.04 1.19 2.30
Australia -0.14 -0.37 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.20
Austria 1.81 0.00 0.64 0.00 1.48 0.00
Belgium 2.76 0.34 0.71 0.01 3.44 0.17
Brazil -4.38 -0.89 0.59 0.03 8.63 1.18
Canada 0.77 -0.19 0.09 0.01 0.27 0.05
Chile -1.59 3.38 0.13 0.58 1.13 16.82
China -6.64 0.71 0.86 0.01 19.87 0.74
Czechia 0.46 0.89 0.03 0.12 0.09 1.17
Denmark 2.32 -0.47 0.78 0.03 2.42 0.32
Estonia 1.47 1.30 0.20 0.16 0.97 2.48
Finland 1.60 0.21 0.66 0.01 1.15 0.07
France 1.92 -0.67 0.47 0.06 1.66 0.66
Germany 1.36 -0.61 0.27 0.05 0.84 0.54
Greece 0.76 -1.92 0.06 0.39 0.26 5.45
Hungary 0.80 0.64 0.08 0.05 0.29 0.60
India -8.22 0.16 0.86 0.00 30.45 0.04
Ireland 2.03 -1.19 0.20 0.07 1.85 2.08
Israel 0.81 -1.43 0.04 0.12 0.30 3.00
Italy 0.40 -1.44 0.03 0.39 0.07 3.05
Japan -0.05 -1.13 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.86
Mexico -2.18 -0.60 0.33 0.03 2.14 0.53
Netherlands 2.22 1.60 0.41 0.21 2.22 3.76
New Zealand 0.88 -1.51 0.06 0.17 0.35 3.34
Norway 1.06 0.89 0.19 0.14 0.51 1.16
Poland -0.23 3.56 0.00 0.49 0.02 18.63
Portugal 0.79 0.23 0.18 0.02 0.28 0.08
Russia -2.82 -1.80 0.47 0.19 3.58 4.78
Slovakia 0.39 2.47 0.02 0.70 0.07 8.95
Slovenia 0.18 2.12 0.00 0.37 0.02 6.60
South Africa -2.99 -1.55 0.55 0.15 4.04 3.56
South Korea -1.08 0.29 0.13 0.01 0.52 0.12
Spain 0.97 -0.54 0.24 0.08 0.42 0.43
Sweden 2.01 0.28 0.64 0.01 1.81 0.11
Switzerland 2.51 0.28 0.57 0.01 2.84 0.11
Turkey -2.85 -0.08 0.67 0.00 3.67 0.01
United Kingdom 2.15 -0.89 0.53 0.09 2.09 1.16
United States 0.73 -2.05 0.06 0.48 0.24 6.21
Table A31: Detailed results for the PCA applied to the variables of the insertion in the interna-
tional regime.
7.3 Clustering
As indicated by figures A35 and A36, the clustering process led to select six classes. The hierar-
chical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a such a clustering and the inter-inertia gains
are still substantial. Table A32 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster.










































































































































































Figure A35: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of countries through their insertion into the
international regime.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 Raw data for the modelling of the modes of regulation
relenv monreg wagelab comp state interreg
Australia relenv_3 monreg_3 wagelab_2 comp_1 state_5 interreg_5
Austria relenv_5 monreg_3 wagelab_1 comp_2 state_6 interreg_7
Belgium relenv_3 monreg_3 wagelab_1 comp_2 state_6 interreg_7
Brazil relenv_2 monreg_5 wagelab_2 comp_4 state_2 interreg_2
Canada relenv_2 monreg_3 wagelab_2 comp_2 state_5 interreg_5
Chile relenv_2 monreg_4 wagelab_5 comp_1 state_3 interreg_3
China relenv_1 monreg_4 wagelab_4 comp_5 state_2 interreg_1
Czechia relenv_2 monreg_3 wagelab_3 comp_2 state_5 interreg_4
Denmark relenv_5 monreg_1 wagelab_1 comp_1 state_6 interreg_7
Estonia relenv_3 monreg_1 wagelab_2 comp_2 state_5 interreg_4
Finland relenv_5 monreg_1 wagelab_1 comp_2 state_6 interreg_7
France relenv_4 monreg_1 wagelab_1 comp_2 state_4 interreg_5
Germany relenv_5 monreg_1 wagelab_1 comp_1 state_5 interreg_7
Greece relenv_4 monreg_3 wagelab_3 comp_4 state_4 interreg_5
Hungary relenv_2 monreg_3 wagelab_2 comp_2 state_4 interreg_4
India relenv_1 monreg_4 wagelab_5 comp_5 state_2 interreg_1
Ireland relenv_4 monreg_1 wagelab_3 comp_1 state_5 interreg_6
Israel relenv_4 monreg_3 wagelab_2 comp_4 state_1 interreg_6
Italy relenv_4 monreg_3 wagelab_1 comp_2 state_4 interreg_5
Japan relenv_4 monreg_2 wagelab_2 comp_1 state_5 interreg_5
Mexico relenv_2 monreg_3 wagelab_5 comp_3 state_2 interreg_2
Netherlands relenv_5 monreg_1 wagelab_1 comp_1 state_6 interreg_7
New Zealand relenv_3 monreg_3 wagelab_2 comp_1 state_6 interreg_6
Norway relenv_5 monreg_1 wagelab_1 comp_2 state_6 interreg_7
Poland relenv_2 monreg_3 wagelab_3 comp_2 state_2 interreg_3
Portugal relenv_4 monreg_3 wagelab_3 comp_2 state_4 interreg_5
Russia relenv_1 monreg_5 wagelab_2 comp_3 state_1 interreg_2
Slovakia relenv_4 monreg_3 wagelab_3 comp_2 state_4 interreg_4
Slovenia relenv_4 monreg_3 wagelab_1 comp_2 state_4 interreg_4
South Africa relenv_1 monreg_4 wagelab_5 comp_4 state_2 interreg_2
South Korea relenv_2 monreg_3 wagelab_2 comp_3 state_3 interreg_2
Spain relenv_4 monreg_3 wagelab_3 comp_2 state_4 interreg_5
Sweden relenv_5 monreg_1 wagelab_1 comp_1 state_6 interreg_7
Switzerland relenv_5 monreg_1 wagelab_2 comp_1 state_5 interreg_7
Turkey relenv_2 monreg_4 wagelab_5 comp_4 state_2 interreg_2
United Kingdom relenv_4 monreg_1 wagelab_2 comp_1 state_6 interreg_5
United States relenv_2 monreg_3 wagelab_2 comp_1 state_3 interreg_5
Table A34: Raw data for the MCA. Each modality of the variable is a qualitative variable used
as an input for the MCA.
9 Full sample
9.1 Multiple correspondences analysis
The first two dimensions of the MCA express 31.87% of the total dataset inertia, a value higher
than the reference value 20.73% of the 0.95-quantile of the inertia percentages distribution ob-
tained by simulating 1245 comparable data tables following a uniform distribution. The informa-
tion contained in this plane is thus significant. Moreover, the first five axes present an amount of
inertia higher than those obtained by the 0.95-quantile of random distributions (58.74% against
44.43%). I kept therefore these axis for the analysis.
Axis 1 distinguishes between countries exhibiting a high frequency for interreg_2, interreg_1,
58
comp_4, comp_5 and wagelab_5 and relenv_1 to countries with a high frequency for interreg_7,
relenv_5, wagelab_1, monreg_1, state_6 and comp_1 and a low frequency for monreg_4 and
state_2. The second axis opposes countries with a high frequency for interreg_7, relenv_5,
wagelab_1, monreg_1, state_6 and comp_1 and a low frequency for monreg_4 and state_2 to
countries sharing a high frequency for interreg_5, state_4, wagelab_3, relenv_4 andmonreg_3.
Axis 3 discriminates between countries with a high frequency for relenv_2, wagelab_5, wagelab_2,
state_1 andmonreg_5 and a low frequency for relenv_4 and state_4 to countries sharing a high
frequency for state_4, comp_2, relenv_4 and interreg_5 and a low frequency for relenv_2 and
interreg_2. The fourth axis 4 opposes countries with a high frequency for wagelab_2, state_1
and monreg_5 to countries sharing a high frequency for relenv_2 and wagelab_5 and a low
frequency for relenv_4 and state_4. Finally, axis 5 distinguishes countries sharing a high fre-
quency for comp_1 and a low frequency for comp_2 to countries with a high frequency comp_2,
comp_4, state_2 and interreg_4 and a low frequency for comp_1.
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Figure A37: Factorial plans of axes 1 and 2 for the countries and the modalities of each variable
for the full sample.
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Figure A38: Factorial plans of axes 3 and 4 for the countries and the modalities of each variable
for the full sample.
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Figure A39: Factorial plans of axes 5 and 6 for the countries and the modalities of each variable































Figure A40: Correlation of the variables to the axes 1 and 2 for the full sample. The more a
variable is on the right side, the more it is correlated to the horizontal axis and the higher is a














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As indicated by figures A43 and A44, the clustering process led to select five classes. The
hierarchical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a such a clustering and the inter-inertia
gains are still substantial. Tables A37 and A38 indicate which variables characterize the most
each cluster. Figures A45, A46 and A47 show the composition of the clusters and their position
on the factorial plans built from the selected axes. Finally, table A39 sums up the characteristics


















































































































































































Figure A43: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of modes of regulation upon the full sample.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Axis 1 (18.47 %)
Full sample
Figure A45: Composition of the clusters identified in the full sample and projection on the



























































Axis 3 (10.91 %)
Full sample
Figure A46: Composition of the clusters identified in the full sample and projection on the


























































Axis 4 (8.26 %)
Full sample
Figure A47: Composition of the clusters identified in the full sample and projection on the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10.1 Multiple correspondences analysis
The first two dimensions of MCA express 34.87% of the total dataset inertia. The reference value
of the 0.95-quantile of the inertia percentages distribution obtained by simulating 1322 compa-
rable data tables following a uniform distribution is equals 24.4%. The variability explained by
this plane is thus significant. It appears that the first 4 axes present an amount of inertia higher
than those obtained by the 0.95-quantile of random distributions (54.49% against 43.12%). Thus
I kept the first 4 axis.
The first axis opposes countries with a high frequency for the factors wagelab_5, relenv_2,
interreg_2, state_2 andmonreg_4 to countries with a high frequency for interreg_7, relenv_5,
wagelab_1, monreg_1 and state_6. Axis 2 discriminates between countries with a high fre-
quency for interreg_7, relenv_5, wagelab_1, monreg_1 and state_6 and countries with a
high frequency for state_4, wagelab_3, relenv_4, monreg_3 and interreg_5. Axis 3 separates
countries with a high frequency for state_5, comp_1 and wagelab_2 and a low frequency for
state_4 from countries with a high frequency for state_4 and wagelab_1 and a low frequency
for wagelab_2, comp_1 and state_5. The fourth axis distinguishes countries whose variables
frequency does not differ significantly from the sample mean from countries with a high frequency
for state_5, comp_1 and wagelab_2 and a low frequency for state_4.

































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A48: Factorial plans of axes 1 and 2 for the countries and the modalities of each variable
for the OECD sample.
[H]
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Figure A49: Factorial plans of axes 3 and 4 for the countries and the modalities of each variable


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As indicated by figures A52 and A53, the clustering process led to select five classes. The
hierarchical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a such a clustering and the inter-inertia
gains are still substantial. Table A42 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster.
Figures A54 and A55 show the composition of the clusters and their position on the factorial
plans built from the selected axes. Finally, table A43 sums up the characteristics of each mode

































































































































































Figure A52: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of modes of regulation upon the OECD sample



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Axis 1 (19.6 %)
OECD sample
Figure A54: Composition of the clusters identified in the OECD sample and projection on the


















































Axis 3 (10.6 %)
OECD sample
Figure A55: Composition of the clusters identified in the OECD sample and projection on the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11.1 Multiple correspondences analysis
The first two dimensions of MCA express 43.8% of the total dataset inertia while the reference
value of the the 0.95-quantile of the inertia percentages distribution obtained by simulating 1265
similar data tables following a uniform distribution is 35.59%. The variability explained by this
plane is therefore significant. It appears that the first four axes carry a significant information
as they synthesize 70.17% of the total inertia, which is higher than those obtained by the 0.95-
quantile of random distributions (59.87%).
Axis 1 opposes countries exhibiting a high frequency for state_4, relenv_4, monreg_3 and
interreg_5 and a low frequency for the factors relenv_5,monreg_1 and interreg_7 to countries
with a high frequency for interreg_7, monreg_1, relenv_5, state_6, comp_1 and wagelab_1
and a low frequency for the factors monreg_3, relenv_4, wagelab_3, comp_2 and state_4.
Axis 2 opposes countries whose variables frequency does not differ significantly from the mean
to countries sharing a high frequency for state_4, relenv_4, monreg_3 and interreg_5 and a
low frequency for relenv_5, monreg_1 and interreg_7. Axis 3 separates countries with a high
frequency for interreg_6, state_5 and wagelab_2 and a low frequency for interreg_3, state_2
and comp_4 to countries with a low frequency for the former variables and a high frequency for
the latter ones. Axis 4 distinguishes between countries sharing low frequencies for comp_1 to
countries exhibiting high values for interreg_6.










































































































































































































































































Figure A56: Factorial plans of axes 1 and 2 for the countries and the modalities of each variable
for the European union sample.
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Figure A57: Factorial plans of axes 3 and 4 for the countries and the modalities of each variable





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As indicated by figures A60 and A61, the clustering process led to select five classes. The
hierarchical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a such a clustering and the inter-inertia
gains are still substantial. Table A46 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster.
Figures A62 and A63 show the composition of the clusters and their position on the factorial
plans built from the selected axes. Finally, table A47 sums up the characteristics of each mode












































































































Figure A60: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of modes of regulation upon the European union
sample

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Axis 1 (26.9 %)
EU sample
Figure A62: Composition of the clusters identified in the European union sample and projection






































Axis 3 (13.8 %)
EU sample
Figure A63: Composition of the clusters identified in the European union sample and projection


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12.1 Multiple correspondences analysis
To perform the multiple correspondences analysis without bias in the results, Norway was re-
moved from the sample since it was detected as an outlier.
The first two dimensions of MCA express 35.12% of the total inertia contained in the dataset,
which is higher than the reference value 31.69%, the variability explained by this plane is thus
significant at the 5% level. (the reference value is obtained by simulating 1284 comparable data
tables following a uniform distribution). Only the first wo axes carry a significant information
(35.12% while the 0-95 quantile reference value is 31.69%). However, I also kept axes 3 and 4 in
the analysis in order to keep more than 50% of the information contained in the initial dataset.
The four axes allow to keep 58% of the inertia.
Axis 1 separates countries with a high frequency of comp_5, interreg_1, relenv_1,monreg_4
and state_2 and a low frequency of comp_1 from the rest of the sample. Axis 2 two opposes
countries sharing a high frequency of interreg_7,monreg_1, relenv_5, comp_5 and interreg_1
to the rest of the sample. Axis 3 differentiates countries with a high frequency for interreg_7,
monreg_1, relenv_5, interreg_2 and comp_3 to countries exhibiting high frequencies of comp_5,
interreg_1, relenv_2, interreg_6, relenv_3 and low frequencies for relenv_2. Finally, the
fourth axis opposes countries with a high frequency of interreg_6, relenv_3 and relenv_4 to
the rest of the sample.
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Figure A64: Factorial plans of axes 1 and 2 for the countries and the modalities of each variable
for the non-EU sample.
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Figure A65: Factorial plans of axes 3 and 4 for the countries and the modalities of each variable





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As indicated by figures A68 and A69, the clustering process led to select five classes. The
hierarchical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a such a clustering and the inter-inertia
gains are still substantial. Table A50 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster.
Figures A70 and A71 show the composition of the clusters and their position on the factorial
plans built from the selected axes. Finally, table A51 sums up the characteristics of each mode






























































































Figure A68: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of modes of regulation upon the non-EU sample




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Axis 1 (20.6 %)
Non-EU sample
Figure A70: Composition of the clusters identified in the non-European union sample and pro-




































Axis 3 (12 %)
Non-EU sample
Figure A71: Composition of the clusters identified in the non-European union sample and pro-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13 Amable and Elie et al. sample
13.1 Multiple correspondences analysis
South Korea had to be removed from the analysis because it was detected as an outlier and
would have biased the analysis.
The first two dimensions of MCA express 45.36% of the total inertia. This value exceeds the
reference value 37.7%, that is the 0.95-quantile of the inertia percentages distribution obtained
by simulating 1371 data tables of same size following a uniform distribution.The first three
axes contain an amount of inertia higher than those obtained by the 0.95-quantile of random
distributions (59.7% against 51.33%). Therefore, the analysis will be carried on with these axes.
Axis 1 discriminates countries with a high frequency of state_6, interreg_7, wagelab_1,
relenv_5 and a low frequency of state_4, state_5, wagelab_2, relenv_4 and interreg_5
and countries with a high frequency of state_4, state_5, interreg_5, interreg_6, monreg_2,
monreg_3, relenv_2, relenv_4, wagelab_2 and wagelab_3 and a low frequency of relenv_5,
state_6, interreg_7 and comp_1. Axis 2 separates countries with a high frequency of state_5,
interreg_6, monreg_2, monreg_3, relenv_2 and wagelab_3 from countries with a high fre-
quency of relenv_2, wagelab_2 and monreg_3. Axis 3 distinguishes countries whose variables
frequencies do not significantly differ from the mean and with a high frequency for state_5,
interreg_6 and monreg_2 from countries with high frequencies of relenv_2, wagelab_2 and
monreg_3.























































































































































































































































Figure A72: Projection of the countries and the modalities of each variables on the factorial plan
of the axes 1 and 2 for the Amable and Elie et al. sample.
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Figure A73: Projection of the countries and the modalities of each variables on the factorial plan



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As indicated by figures A76 and A77, the clustering process led to select five classes. The
hierarchical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a such a clustering and the inter-inertia
gains are still substantial. Table A56 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster.
Figures A78 and A79 show the composition of the clusters and their position on the factorial
plans built from the selected axes. Finally, table A57 sums up the characteristics of each mode















































































































Figure A76: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of modes of regulation upon the Amable and
Elie et al. sample



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Axis 1 (26.4 %)
Amable-Elie et al. sample
Figure A78: Composition of the clusters identified in the Amable (2003) and Elie et al. (2012)









































Axis 2 (19 %)
Amable-Elie et al. sample
Figure A79: Composition of the clusters identified in the Amable (2003) and Elie et al. (2012)






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14.1 Multiple correspondences analysis
Axes 1 and 2 express 44.87% of the total inertia. This values exceeds the reference value 36.84%:
The variability explained by this plane is significant at the 5% level (the reference value is ob-
tained through simulation of 1443 data comparable tables on the basis of a uniform distribution).
Only these two axes present an amount of inertia greater than those obtained by the 0.95-quantile
of random distributions (44.87% against 36.84%). Here I kept these two axes since the informa-
tion they contained is close to 50%. Also, doing so allowed to retrieve three meaningful clusters,
which made the comparison with Jahn (2014) easier.
The first axis opposes countries with a high frequency for interreg_7, relenv_5, wagelab_1,
state_6 and monreg_1 and a low frequency for wagelab_3, monreg_3, state_4, relenv_4 and
interreg_5 to countries with a high frequency of relenv_4, interreg_5 and wagelab_3 and a
low frequency for relenv_5, interreg_7, wagelab_1 and state_6.
Axis 2 discriminates between countries with a high frequency of wagelab_2, comp_1, state_5
and relenv_2 and a low frequency for state_4, comp_2 and wagelab_1 and countries sharing a
high frequency of state_4, relenv_4, wagelab_3 and comp_2 and a low frequency of wagelab_2
and comp_1.






































































































































































































































































Figure A80: Projection of the countries and the modalities of each variables on the factorial plan































Figure A81: Correlation of the variables to the axes 1 and 2 for the Jahn sample.
Coordinates Square cosines Contribution
Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 1 Dim 2
relenv_2 0.89 1.70 0.08 0.30 2.06 10.29
relenv_3 -0.01 0.76 0.00 0.10 0.00 3.07
relenv_4 0.89 -0.49 0.49 0.15 8.31 3.40
relenv_5 -1.11 -0.22 0.75 0.03 12.90 0.69
monreg_1 -0.71 -0.15 0.46 0.02 6.62 0.42
monreg_2 0.75 1.37 0.03 0.09 0.74 3.35
monreg_3 0.64 0.02 0.37 0.00 5.30 0.01
wagelab_1 -0.74 -0.49 0.49 0.22 7.11 4.33
wagelab_2 0.34 1.22 0.06 0.74 1.04 18.49
wagelab_3 1.25 -0.90 0.37 0.19 8.22 5.76
comp_1 -0.27 0.64 0.08 0.45 1.07 8.03
comp_2 0.13 -0.61 0.01 0.28 0.19 6.06
comp_4 1.85 -1.51 0.17 0.11 4.49 4.05
state_3 0.95 2.18 0.05 0.24 1.18 8.51
state_4 1.17 -1.19 0.43 0.44 9.05 12.64
state_5 0.11 0.85 0.01 0.29 0.10 7.77
state_6 -0.83 -0.15 0.52 0.02 8.19 0.36
interreg_5 0.89 0.06 0.73 0.00 10.51 0.06
interreg_6 0.22 0.73 0.01 0.06 0.12 1.91
interreg_7 -1.04 -0.23 0.81 0.04 12.83 0.82
Table A58: Detailed results for the MCA applied to the Jahn (2014) sample, for the variables.
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Coordinates Square cosines Contribution
Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 1 Dim 2
Australia 0.36 0.88 0.06 0.35 1.05 8.39
Austria -0.63 -0.42 0.31 0.14 3.17 1.91
Belgium -0.40 -0.18 0.08 0.02 1.25 0.34
Canada 0.64 0.81 0.14 0.22 3.25 6.98
Denmark -1.01 -0.15 0.82 0.02 8.01 0.24
Finland -0.92 -0.46 0.65 0.17 6.71 2.31
France 0.35 -0.72 0.08 0.33 0.97 5.57
Germany -0.81 0.10 0.45 0.01 5.11 0.11
Greece 1.44 -1.00 0.40 0.19 16.24 10.78
Ireland 0.32 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.80 0.31
Italy 0.64 -0.68 0.26 0.29 3.23 4.93
Japan 0.58 0.91 0.07 0.18 2.66 8.92
Netherlands -1.01 -0.15 0.82 0.02 8.01 0.24
New Zealand 0.02 0.80 0.00 0.19 0.00 6.92
Norway -0.92 -0.46 0.65 0.17 6.71 2.31
Portugal 1.07 -0.78 0.54 0.29 8.96 6.52
Spain 1.07 -0.78 0.54 0.29 8.96 6.52
Sweden -1.01 -0.15 0.82 0.02 8.01 0.24
Switzerland -0.58 0.53 0.21 0.18 2.61 2.98
United Kingdom 0.07 0.28 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.85
United States 0.74 1.45 0.09 0.37 4.26 22.64
Table A59: Detailed results for the MCA applied to the Jahn (2014) sample, for the countries.
14.2 Clustering
As indicated by figures A76 and A77, the clustering process led to select three classes. The
hierarchical tree exhibits fairly long branches justifying a such a clustering and the inter-inertia
gains are still substantial. Table A56 indicates which variables characterize the most each cluster.
Figure A84 shows the composition of the clusters and their position on the factorial plans built
from the selected axes. Finally, table A61 sums up the characteristics of each mode of regulation



















































































































Figure A82: Hierarchical tree for the clustering of modes of regulation upon the Jahn sample
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Axis 1 (25.9 %)
Jahn sample
Figure A84: Composition of the clusters identified in the Jahn (2014) sample and projection on





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15 Comparison with Amable, Elie et al. and Jahn
The following tables (A62 and A63) offer a comparison of the clusters obtained using the Jahn
(2014) sample and the Amable (2003) and Elie et al. (2012) sample, as discussed in section 6 of
the article.
Jahn This article using the Jahn sample
Models of environ-
mental politics





















Norway, Finland, Sweden Anglo-Saxon and Pa-
cific
Australia, Canada, Ireland,






France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, UK,
USA
Southern European France, Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal, Spain
Table A62: Comparisons of the models of Jahn (2014) with the models of capitalism including
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